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THE PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF DISGORGEMENT ORDERS 
IN NON-DISCHARGEABILITY ACTIONS UNDER § 523(A)(19) 
ABSTRACT 
In two cases recently decided by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, the courts 
independently considered whether a disgorgement order levied by securities 
regulators against a debtor is excepted from statutory discharge under 
§ 523(a)(19) of the Code. The issue split the panels in both cases, producing 
vehement dissents. In both circuits, the majority held that § 523 does not 
except a debt arising from a disgorgement order from statutory discharge 
under § 727 if the debtor has not been charged with or convicted of violating 
state or federal securities laws. Thus, a debtor’s obligation to disgorge funds 
acquired through the fraudulent activity of a third party is a dischargeable 
obligation in bankruptcy. 
This Comment argues that the decisions by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits 
incorrectly construed the plain meaning of § 523(a)(19) and ignored language 
in the statute that broadens the exception to embrace a debtor’s obligation to 
disgorge funds acquired through the fraudulent misconduct of another 
individual. The Comment emphasizes that the character of the debt determined 
by the state courts should have been given preclusive effect by the bankruptcy 
courts. Deference to the state courts coincides with long-standing doctrines in 
bankruptcy law, which preserve in bankruptcy the property rights of the debtor 
defined by state or non-bankruptcy law. This new approach would aid the 
enforcement of security laws and support a framework for debtor attorneys 
and regulators preparing for litigation. Finally, lending preclusive effect to 
disgorgement orders does not threaten misappropriation of § 523 exceptions. 
Properly construed, § 523(a)(19) should except a debtor’s obligation to return 
fraudulent funds regardless of their culpability for a security violation because 
there is a legitimate government interest in mitigating the egregious effect of 
large-scale investment fraud and protecting investors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On August 23, 2012, The Wall Street Journal reported the distribution of 
$2.4 billion in liquidated assets of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, 
L.L.C. (Madoff Securities) to 1,229 investors defrauded by Madoff’s infamous 
Ponzi scheme.1 The distribution represented the latest effort of Irving Picard, 
the trustee overseeing Madoff Securities’ liquidation, to compensate victims of 
the scheme for nearly $17.3 billion in missing funds.2 
The devastation wreaked by the fund’s collapse in 2008 has earned the 
Madoff Securities scheme notoriety as the largest Ponzi scheme in history.3 In 
the aftermath of Madoff’s arrest, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) faced the daunting task of investigating nearly 15,000 claims seeking an 
estimated total of $64.8 billion.4 Over five years later, litigation to return the 
misappropriated funds to their rightful owners continues.5  
While the SEC denies there has been a “dramatic upswing in terms of the 
number of [Ponzi cases],” the SEC has noted an upward trend in the magnitude 
of the schemes filed.6 As the Madoff Securities scheme demonstrated, 
investors damaged by fraud are not limited to sophisticated multinational 
corporations.7 Many middle-income Americans saw their retirement savings 
 
 1 Jacqueline Palank, Madoff Trustee Cleared to Return $2.4 Billion, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Aug. 
23, 2012, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390444270404577607353850654 
214. 
 2 Id. 
 3 See Kaja Whitehouse, Madoff Refund Checks Hitting Mailboxes Soon, N.Y. POST, July 13, 2011, 
available at http://nypost.com/2011/07/13/madoff-refund-checks-hitting-mailboxes-soon/. 
 4 In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. L.L.C., 424 B.R. 122, 124 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 5 Here and Now: Echoes of the Madoff Scandal on 5 year Anniversary, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Dec. 
10, 2013) (interview with Wall Street Journal reporter, Jason Bellini, explaining that “there’s still a lot of 
litigation five years later going on”). See generally Dan Fitzpatrick & Jean Eaglesham, J.P. Morgan to Pay 
Madoff Penalties, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Jan. 5, 2014, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424052702304617404579303384279905314 (reporting that as of date of the article, trustee would 
distribute $1.7 billion in settlement funds to victims of the Madoff scheme); Tom Hays, 4 Years In, Madoff 
Trustees Still Pursuing Assets, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 10, 2012, available at http://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/news/nation/2012/12/10/madoff-trustee-assets/1759629/ (stating that as of date of the article the pursuit 
of assets “show[ed] no signs of slowing”). 
 6 Karey Wutowski, SEC Says Magnitude of Ponzi Schemes Is Growing, REUTERS, Feb. 6, 2009, 
available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2009/02/06/us-sec-madoff-idUKTRE5154QR20090206. 
 7 See Robert Frank et al., Fund Fraud Hits Big Names—Madoff’s Clients Included Mets Owner, GMAC 
Chairman, Country-Club Recruits, THE WALL Street JOURNAL, Dec. 13, 2008, at A1. 
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vanish overnight, which constituted portions of feeder funds that contributed to 
the Madoff scheme.8 
In addition to illuminating the spectrum of victims affected by Ponzi 
schemes and the shortcomings of federal regulation,9 the Madoff scandal also 
revealed the limitations of investor recovery after the Ponzi scheme’s operator 
enters bankruptcy. Many investors expected their missing funds to be returned 
to them by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (“SIPC”), which is 
regarded as the “first line of defense in the event a brokerage firm fails owing 
customer cash and securities that are missing from customer accounts . . . .”10 
However, many investors found this avenue of recovery closed to them by 
statutory limitations, as the SIPC only protects cash and security investments,11 
and does not cover victims who invested in the scheme indirectly through 
feeder funds.12 These restrictions, coupled with limited SIPC funding, 
 
 8 See generally Joe Bel Bruno, Not Just Super Rich Caught Up in the Madoff Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Dec. 15, 2008, available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/2008/12/14/not-just-super-rich-caught-up-in-
madoff-case/ (reporting that pension funds and charities were also affected by Madoff case); James Sterngold, 
Madoff Victims Recount the Long Road Back, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Dec. 9, 2013, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023035602045792482 21657387860 (reporting on the 
struggles of individual victims of the Madoff Securities scheme who lost their retirement money, college 
funds, and life savings); Dan Strumpf, Madoff Scandal Still Haunts Victims, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL 
ONLINE, Dec. 10, 2012, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732433920457817 
1422302043906 (reporting the lost retirement savings of a 62-year-old farmer in Colorado). 
 9 See Bruno, supra note 8; Kara Scannell, SEC Had Chances for Years to Expose Madoff’s Alleged 
Ponzi Scheme, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Dec. 15, 2008, at A16. 
 10 Mallory A. Sullivan, Note, When the Bezzle Bursts: Restitutionary Distribution of Assets After Ponzi 
Schemes Enter Bankruptcy, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1589, 1593–94 (2011) (citation omitted). 
 11 See Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
(Mar. 27, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/answers/sipc.htm. 
 12 See Sullivan, supra note 10, at 1594 (explaining that such individuals fail to meet the definition of 
“customer” in § 78111(2) of SIPA); see also Christine Hurt, Evil Has a New Name (And a New Narrative): 
Bernard Madoff, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 947, 971 (“SIPC rules also count only direct customers in [Madoff 
Securities] as eligible for SIPC compensation . . . [i]ndividual clients of feeder funds must look to that fund for 
compensation.”). SIPC also limits claims to the principal amount that the victim had invested, minus 
distributions that they might have taken over the years. Hurt provided the following example of these statutory 
limitations: 
[I]f an investor placed a $100,000 inheritance with Madoff in 1985 and believed that in 2008 it 
had grown to $400,000, then the investor argues the loss is $400,000, but SIPC argues the loss is 
$100,000. In addition if that investor took out $50,000 in 2001 to send a child to college, the 
SIPC argues the loss is $50,000. If the investor sent two children to college at $50,000 each, then 
SIPC argues that there is no loss and no valid claim, regardless of whether the last statement 
falsely led the investor to believe that she had a nest egg of $400,000 and regardless of the 
investor’s actions in reliance on that belief. In addition, the loss is estimated at $100,000 
regardless of inflation or concepts of the time value of money. 
Id. at 970. 
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transformed many defrauded investors into claimants seeking restitution in the 
muddled world of bankruptcy.13 In bankruptcy, a trustee collects and liquidates 
the debtor’s non-exempt assets to distribute to creditors.14 After distribution, 
the bankruptcy court must grant the debtor a discharge “from all debts that 
arose before the date of the order for relief . . . .”15 However, the collapse of a 
Ponzi scheme presents the trustee with unique challenges. Among them is the 
difficulty of negotiating claims for restitution brought by creditors that are 
victims of the debtor’s fraud.16 
Creditors with restitution claims possess state-law property rights, 
traditionally known as an “equity,” that give claimants the right to recover title 
or possession of property held unlawfully by a debtor.17 A claim for restitution 
restores legal title to the transferor by invalidating the debtor’s property rights 
in the money transferred.18 However, when a claimant seeks restitution against 
a debtor in bankruptcy, the “[p]roperty in which the claimant has an equitable 
interest—a claim to restitution that is valid at state law—is now in the hands of 
the trustee.”19 If the restitution claim is denied, then ownership of the 
claimant’s property—procured through fraud by the debtor—is now imparted 
 
 13 See In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., L.L.C., 424 B.R. 122, 133 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting In 
re Adler Coleman Clearing Corp., 195 B.R. 266, 269–70 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996)) (“[A] liquidation 
proceeding shall be conducted in accordance with, and as though it were being conducted under chapters 1, 3 
and 5 and subchapters I and II of chapter 7 of Title 11.”); see also Mark T. Cramer & R. Alexander Pilmer, 
Swindler’s List: Formal Dissolution Proceedings Are Usually Necessary to Sort Through the Wreckage of 
Failed Ponzi Schemes, L.A. Law., June 2009, at 24 (noting failed Ponzi schemes often end up in bankruptcy). 
 14 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (2012). The priorities are numerous. Under § 507, claims are prioritized in the 
following order: 1) unsecured claims for domestic support obligations; 2) administrative expenses related the 
debtor’s estate; 3) unsecured claims allowed under § 502(f); 4) allowed unsecured claims of employees or of 
the debtor for wages or sales commissions; 5) allowed unsecured claims for contributions to an employee 
benefit plan; 6) unsecured claims of persons that raise grain against a debtor operating a grain elevator; 7) 
claims of individuals that deposited money with the debtor before the commencement of the case for lease, 
purchase, or rental of property; 8) unsecured claims of governmental units for uncollected taxes; 9) claims of a 
federal depository institution; and 10) claims against the debtor for death or injury resulting from the debtor’s 
negligent operation of a motor vehicle. Id. § 507. Chapter 7 provides that only after distribution to claimants 
under § 507 may the remaining assets of the debtor be used to satisfy claimants under § 726. Id. § 726(a)(1). 
Allowed unsecured claimants are next, followed by claims for fines, penalties, forfeitures or any damages 
arising before the order for relief. Id. § 726(a)(2)–(4). The debtor may then pay any interest on claims 
sustained under § 726, and retain any residual assets. Id. § 726(a)(5)–(6).  
 15 Id. § 727(b). 
 16 See, e.g., Andrew Kull, Restitution in Bankruptcy: Reclamation and Constructive Trust, 72 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 265 (1998); Sullivan, supra note 10. 
 17 Kull, supra note 16, at 265. 
 18 Id. at 277. 
 19 Id. at 282. 
BAIRD GALLEYSPROOFS2 8/7/2014 12:09 PM 
2014] THE PRECLUSIVE EFFECT 387 
to the trustee and will be distributed to the debtor’s creditors.20 The 
nonconsensual transfer, originally between claimant and debtor has now 
evolved into a nonconsensual transfer between claimant and the debtor’s 
creditors.21 
Most victims of a Ponzi scheme will find the restitution remedy 
unsatisfactory. Though defrauded investors may “obtain restitution from any 
traceable product” of the property, and they are entitled to claim restitution 
through a process known as “tracing,”22 it is nearly impossible to identify 
which of the debtor’s comingled funds have been redistributed to other 
investors or incorporated into the debtor’s estate.23 In such an instance, the 
burden falls on the lower state courts to determine the interests of the 
competing claimants using their power in equity. 24 
Other common remedies for securities fraud include the SEC’s power to 
exact investor disgorgement of ill-gotten monetary gains. The SEC obtained 
express power to seek disgorgement of monetary gains acquired through illegal 
conduct through the adoption of the Securities Enforcement Remedies and 
Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990.25 The SEC has traditionally used 
disgorgement primarily as a tool for enforcement and not as a means to 
compensate investors.26 A disgorgement proceeding is designed to deprive 
defendants of ill-gotten gains by requiring the wrongdoer to turn over the 
amount by which they have been unjustly enriched.27 Unlike an act for 
restitution, which is brought to compensate fraud victims for their losses, 
disgorgement is an equitable remedy that “extends only to the amount with 
interest by which the defendant profited from his wrongdoing.”28 
 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. (“Property obtained by fraud or mistake, like property obtained by theft, has not come into 
possession of the debtor by a voluntary transaction. To distribute it to creditors would therefore result in an 
involuntary transfer, accomplished in two stages, from claimant to creditors.”). Id.  
 22 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §58(1) (2011). 
 23 See Kull, supra note 16, at 283. 
 24 Sullivan, supra note 10, at 1600 (citation omitted) (“Once the assets are returned to the estate, the court 
is given broad power to rule on a plan of distribution, subject only to the requirement that the court ‘use its 
discretion in a logical way to divide the money.’”). 
 25 Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931; 
Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for Defrauded Investors?, 63 BUS. LAW. 317, 320 
(2008). 
 26 Black, supra note 25, at 321. 
 27 SEC, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 308(C) OF THE SARBANES OXLEY ACT OF 2002 3, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/sox308creport.pdf [hereinafter SEC Report] (citing The Securities 
Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No 101-429, 104 Stat. 931). 
 28 Id. (quoting SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978)). 
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In 2002, investors gained an important ally in the effort to recover stolen 
funds when Congress granted the SEC additional compensatory power under 
§ 308 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).29 Section 308 creates the Federal 
Account for Investor Restitution (known as the FAIR Fund) and permits the 
SEC to distribute monies collected in satisfaction of an enforcement action to 
investors harmed by the security violation, rather than into the coffers of the 
U.S. Treasury.30 With this new authority, the SEC’s role extends beyond the 
traditional role of “enforcing securities law, sanctioning securities laws 
violators, and deterring future fraud”31 to embrace a compensatory role for 
defrauded investors.32 This broader power has also drawn criticism from 
securities scholars, concerned that the SEC’s power under § 308 infringes on 
an avenue for recovery that was previously available only to private 
plaintiffs—and not the responsibility of securities regulators.33 The Bankruptcy 
Code (Code) embraces the notion that debts incurred through the debtor’s 
malfeasance should not be extinguished in bankruptcy.34 For example, under 
§ 727(a)(4) a debtor can be denied discharge in its entirety if the debtor 
received or attempted to obtain the money through fraud.35 The Code also 
 
 29 See Verity Winship, Fair Funds and the SEC’s Compensation of Injured Investors, 60 FLA. L. REV. 
1103, 1118 (2008).  
 30 See Black, supra note 25, at 318 (citing Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-24, § 308, 116 
Stat. 745, 784 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2012))); Winship, supra note 29, at 1118 (citations omitted) 
(“Whereas until [the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002] any civil money penalties had been required 
to be paid into the U.S. Treasury, the Fair Fund provision of Sarbanes-Oxley allowed penalties paid in 
enforcement actions to be added to disgorgement funds and paid to the injured investors[.]”). Section 308(a) 
provides: 
If, in any judicial or administrative action brought by the Commission under the securities laws, 
the Commission obtains a civil penalty against any person for a violation of such laws, or such 
person agrees, in settlement of any such action, to such civil penalty, the amount of such civil 
penalty shall, on the motion or at the direction of the Commission, be added to and become part 
of a disgorgement fund or other fund established for the benefit of the victims of such violation. 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-24, § 308(a), 116 Stat. 745, 784 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7246). 
 31 Black, supra note 25, at 319–20. 
 32 Id. at 318. 
 33 See generally id. at 318–19; Winship, supra note 29, at 1138. 
 34 See Anthony Michael Sabino, Preventing an Alchemy of Evil: Preserving the Nondischargeability of a 
Debt Obtained by Fraud, 12 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 99, 100 (2003). This wisdom was reaffirmed by Justice 
Stevens in Grogan v. Garner when he explained that “in the same breath that [the Supreme Court Justices] 
have invoked this ‘fresh start’ policy, [they] have been careful to explain that the Act limits the opportunity for 
a completely unencumbered new beginning to the ‘honest but unfortunate debtor.’” Grogan v. Garner, 498 
U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)). 
 35 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4) (2012).  
BAIRD GALLEYSPROOFS2 8/7/2014 12:09 PM 
2014] THE PRECLUSIVE EFFECT 389 
excepts specific types of debts from discharge under § 523.36 Examples of 
debts that can be nondischargeable under these exceptions include debts 
incurred by the debtor through fraud or embezzlement,37 student loans,38 and 
death or personal injury claims against the debtor for drunk driving.39 These 
provisions are instrumental in preventing debtors from abusing the bankruptcy 
process by using the Code as a shield to avoid payment of debts incurred 
through nefarious behavior.40 
The focus of this Comment is the exception to discharge provided under 
§ 523(a)(19). This provision is a recent addition to the laundry list of 
exceptions added by Congress in 2002, and has received little attention from 
the federal courts. Specifically, this Comment investigates two opinions 
published by the Ninth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals construing the 
scope of § 523(a)(19). In each case, the courts considered whether the 
exception to discharge under § 523(a)(19) applies to debts incurred by debtors 
that are not directly liable for a security violation, but acquired funds through 
the fraudulent acts of a third party.41 
Ultimately, both courts determined that the money the debtors owed to the 
security regulators was not excepted from discharge by operation of 
§ 523(a)(19).42 To support their arguments, the majority opinions examined the 
statute’s legislative history and parsed the language of the statute in an effort to 
determine the provision’s plain meaning.43 However, the issue sparked strong 
disagreement in both cases, as each dissenting opinion disagreed with the 
majority’s interpretation of the statute’s meaning and its characterization of the 
underlying debt.44 
 
 36 See id. § 523. 
 37 Id. § 523(a)(2)(A). 
 38 Id. § 523(a)(8)(B). 
 39 Id. § 523(a)(9). 
 40 See Sabino, supra note 34, at 101. 
 41  See infra Part II.A. 
 42 Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Wilcox, 691 F.3d 1171, 1177 (10th Cir. 2012) (reversing 
Bankruptcy Court grant of summary judgment to security regulator plaintiffs which had declared that a debt 
was nondischargeable in bankruptcy when resulting from a violation of a securities law); Sherman v. SEC (In 
re Sherman), 658 F.3d 1009, 1019 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding “that 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19) prevents the discharge 
of debts for securities-related wrongdoings only in cases where the debtor is responsible for that 
wrongdoing”), abrogated by Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A.,133 S. Ct. 1754 (2013). 
 43 See Faught, 691 F.3d at 1175–76; Sherman, 658 F.3d at 1012–13, 1016–17, abrogated by Bullock v. 
BankChampaign, N.A.,133 S. Ct. 1754 (2013). 
 44 Faught, 691 F.3d at 1177, 1181–82 (Briscoe, C.J., dissenting); Sherman, 658 F.3d at 1016–17, 1021 
(Fisher, J., dissenting), abrogated by Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754 (2013). 
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This Comment provides additional support for these dissenting opinions by 
examining inconsistencies with the majority opinions. Specifically, this 
Comment argues that the majority opinions authored by the Ninth and Tenth 
Circuits erroneously permitted the debtors to discharge a debt owed to satisfy a 
disgorgement order secured against them by state securities regulators. The 
court should have upheld the motion of the securities regulators and declared 
the debt nondischargeable. The narrow construction of § 523(a)(19) adopted by 
these courts is flawed because it confuses legal precedent established under 
§ 523(a)(2)(A) with the intended purpose of § 523(a)(19). Contrary to the 
courts’ opinions, § 523(a)(19) embraces state-court orders to disgorge profits 
obtained by the debtor through unjust enrichment, regardless of whether the 
debtor has been charged with violating securities laws. The Circuit Court’s 
rationale for adopting a narrow construction of § 523(a)(19) is flawed because 
it misconstrues the legislative history of the statute and the legal precedent 
adjudicating the dischargeability of fraudulent debts. Finally, the opinion 
promotes an inconsistent legal interpretation of the statute and fails to account 
for significant differences among state courts awarding disgorgement in an 
action for unjust enrichment. Correctly construed, the statute should recognize 
state court judgments establishing the debtor’s liability for a disgorgement debt 
and declare such debts nondischargeable. 
To support this argument, Part II of this Comment will briefly outline the 
development of exceptions to discharge for debts incurred through vicarious 
liability for fraud and discuss scholars’ competing constructions of provisions 
in § 523(a). In Part III, this Comment will examine the opinions of the Ninth 
and Tenth Circuit Courts and the rationale for adopting a narrow interpretation 
of § 523(a)(19). Part III also examines inconsistencies in the majority opinion 
and demonstrates that the opinions gloss over important doctrinal distinctions 
that should have dissuaded the adoption of a narrow construction of 
§ 523(a)(19). Part IV of the Comment will argue that permitting a bankruptcy 
court to go beyond the disgorgement order itself and consider the debtor’s 
liability for the underlying violation encroaches on the jurisdiction of non-
bankruptcy courts and the power of state courts to award proper remedy for the 
violations of the securities laws in their respective jurisdictions. The analysis 
conducted in Part V will demonstrate that awarding preclusive effect to 
monetary judgments or disgorgement orders for unjust enrichment through 
securities fraud is consistent with historical practice in the courts efforts to 
adjudicate securities enforcement actions. Finally, Part V revisits the scholarly 
construction of § 523(a) exceptions and suggests that § 523(a)(19) is better 
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understood as an exception advancing the government’s interest in protecting 
statutory remedies for securities fraud and would be better cast as a “type” 
exception rather than a “conduct” exception.  
I. BACKGROUND AND LEGAL DOCTRINE 
A. The History of Exceptions to Fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A) 
The history of imputed liability to debtors for fraud in bankruptcy begins 
with the statutory predecessor to § 523(a)(19). Before Congress amended the 
Code in 2002, bankruptcy courts determined the dischargeability of fraudulent 
debts largely under § 523(a)(2)(A).45 “Unfortunately, little legislative history 
exists on the enactment of § 523(a)(2)(A).”46 The remnants that remain suggest 
that Congress intended § 523(a)(2)(A) to codify existing case law involving 
dischargeability.47 A brief examination of this case law reveals that courts have 
historically struggled to apply the dischargeability exception as developing 
theories of agency imputed liability for fraud to third parties. This brief survey 
of cases demonstrates that claims against a debtor’s estate for funds obtained 
illegally introduces tension in the administration of the estate, as the 
regulator’s interest in preventing individuals from profiting from illegal 
activity48 conflicts with the Code’s interest of providing relief to the honest, 
but unfortunate debtor.49 
The relevant case law involving exceptions to discharge for fraudulent 
misconduct begin with Justice Harlan’s opinion in Neal v. Clark.50 In Neal, the 
Supreme Court considered whether a debtor that purchased and resold 
 
 45 See Michael J. Kaufman, 26 SEC. LITIG.: DAMAGES §5D:5 (2013) (explaining that “[s]ection 
523(a)(2)(A) . . . has largely been replaced with [s]ection 523(a)(19) for securities law violations”); see also 
Lucian Murley, Note, Closing A Bankruptcy Loophole or Impairing a Debtor’s Fresh Start? Sarbanes-Oxley 
Creates a New Exception to Discharge, 92 KY. L.J. 317, 326 (2003) (citations omitted) (referring to 
§ 523(a)(2) as “the most litigated exception to fraud”). 
 46 Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, Determining Congressional Intent Regarding Dischargeability of Imputed 
Fraud Debts in Bankruptcy, 54 MERCER L. REV. 987, 998 (2003).  
 47 See id. at 999 (citing 124 CONG. REC. H11089, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6436, 6453 (95th 
Cong. 2d Sess.)) (explaining that “[s]ubparagraph (A) is intended to codify current case law, e.g. Neal v. 
Clark . . . which interprets ‘fraud’ to mean actual or positive fraud rather than fraud implied in law”). 
 48 See 79A C.J.S. Securities Regulation §6 (2014) (citing SEC v. Zandford, 258 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 2001), 
rev’d on other grounds, 535 U.S. 813 (2002) and SEC v. Southwest Coal and Energy Co., 624 F.2d 1312 (5th 
Cir. 1980)) (“The prevention of fraud and deceptive practices is also stated to be a major objective of federal 
securities regulation.”). 
 49 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991). 
 50 See generally Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704 (1877) (articulating that “fraud” as interpreted in the original 
Bankrupt Act of 1867 means positive fraud, or fraud in fact, involving “moral turpitude” or intentional wrong). 
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unauthorized bonds from the executor of an estate could discharge a debt 
imputed to him through a judgment obtained by the purchasers of the bonds.51 
The Virginia Supreme Court determined Neal’s debt to the bondholders 
amounted to debts for constructive fraud that were nondischargeable in 
bankruptcy.52 On appeal, Justice Harlan refuted the reasoning of the Virginia 
Supreme Court and instead likened the fraud committed by the executor to 
embezzlement.53 Because embezzlement required the intent to deceive, Harlan 
reasoned that Neal’s debts were dischargeable because Neal’s debts lacked the 
“moral turpitude” necessary to establish actual fraud.54 Thus, the original 
perception of dischargeability of fraudulent debts was that the exception to 
discharge applied only to the debtors that committed actual fraud.55 Any claim 
for exception to discharge levied against a debtor under a theory of vicarious 
liability “require[d] the culpability of the debtor to have risen to the level of 
committing actual fraud.”56 
However, Justice Harlan effectively reversed the Neal precedent a decade 
later in Strang v. Bradner.57 In Strang, the debtor’s business partner had 
induced the plaintiffs to extend nearly $20,000 in credit to the partnership by 
representing that the partnership had sufficient funds to repay the notes through 
the sale of wool.58 The partnership became insolvent, and the partner attempted 
to discharge its debt to the creditors through bankruptcy.59 In departure from 
Neal, the Supreme Court held that a partner was liable for the 
misrepresentations made by another partner in the firm according to principles 
of agency.60 Justice Harlan added that this is “especially so when . . . the 
 
 51 See id. at 704–05. 
 52 Id. at 707. 
 53 Id. at 709. 
 54 See id. at 709 (“[W]e remark, that, in the section of the law of 1867 which sets forth the classes of 
debts which are exempted from the operation of a discharge in bankruptcy, debts created by ‘fraud’ are 
associated directly with debts created by ‘embezzlement.’ Such association justifies, if it does not imperatively 
require, the conclusion that the ‘fraud’ referred to in that section means positive fraud, or fraud in fact, 
involving moral turpitude or intentional wrong, as does embezzlement; and not implied fraud, or fraud in law, 
which may exist without the imputation of bad faith or immorality.”). 
 55 See Radwan, supra note 46, at 998–99. 
 56 W. Brian Memory, Vicarious Nondischargeability for Fraudulent Debts: Understanding the Dual 
Purposes of § 523(a)(2)(A), 20 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 633, 640 (2004). Memory explains, “[b]ecause Neal’s 
vicarious liability under Virginia law imputed only gross negligence, his culpability simply would not merit 
vicarious nondischargeability for the executor’s fraudulent debt.” Id. 
 57 See generally Strang v. Bradner, 114 U.S. 555 (1885). 
 58 Id. at 557–58. 
 59 See id. at 558. 
 60 Id. at 561 (“[I]f, in the conduct of partnership business . . . one partner makes false or fraudulent 
misrepresentations of fact to the injury of innocent persons who deal with him as representing the firm, and 
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partners, who were not themselves guilty of wrong, received and appropriated 
the fruits of the fraudulent conduct of their associate in business.”61 Thus, 
Strang expands the discharge exception to include certain debts for fraudulent 
activity imputed to the debtor, and does not treat the debtor’s intent to commit, 
or culpability for the underlying fraud, as dispositive of the debt’s 
nondischargeability.62 
The confusion generated by the inconsistency of the Neal and Strang 
opinions was exacerbated by the adoption of §523(a)(2)(A). Although 
Congress articulated the specific “inten[t] to codify current case law e.g., Neal 
v. Clark,” the statute lacks any language requiring that debt be “created by the 
fraud . . . of the bankrupt.”63 Thus, some courts continue to deny discharge to 
debtors vicariously liable for fraud under the relevant law of agency,64 as 
Strang is “still good law.”65 
However, inconsistencies in the legislative history and statutory language 
of §523(a)(2)(A) has made some courts uneasy “about what to do in cases of 
potential vicarious liability,” and compelled courts to create barriers to 
vicarious nondischargeability claims.66 For example, some courts have 
required the creditor to prove the debtor was aware or should have been aware 
of the fraudulent party’s activity before denying a vicariously liable debtor 
discharge of the fraudulent debt.67 Others require the creditor to prove that the 
 
without notice of any limitation upon his general authority, his partners cannot escape pecuniary responsibility 
therefor upon the ground that such misrepresentation were made without their knowledge.”). 
 61 Id. 
 62 See id. (“Whether the claim asserted by plaintiffs is regarded as one arising out of the deceit or fraud of 
the defendants, or as a debt created by their fraud, the discharges in bankruptcy do not constitute a defense.”); 
Radwan, supra note 46, at 1005. 
 63 Memory, supra note 56, at 643 (quoting 124 CONG. REC. S17412 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978)). 
 64 See generally Reuter v. Cutcliff (In re Reuter), 686 F.3d 511 (8th Cir. 2012); Tummel v. Quinlivan (In 
re Quinlivan), 434 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2005); Deodati v. M.M. Winkler & Assocs., (In re Winkler & Assocs.), 
239 F.3d. 746 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 65 Deodati, 239 F.3d. at 749 (noting the approach exemplified by the Fifth Circuit in Winkler has been 
coined the “absolute” approach, and generally results in denial of discharge in cases dealing with imputed 
fraud); Sachan v. Huh (In re Huh), BAP No. CC-12-1633-En Banc., 2014 WL 936803, at *7 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
Mar. 11, 2014). 
 66 Memory, supra note 56, at 645. 
 67 See Walker v. Citizens State Bank of Maryville, Mo. (In re Walker), 726 F.2d 452, 454 (8th Cir. 1984) 
(holding that more than the mere existence of an agent-principal relationship is required to charge the agent’s 
fraud to the principal and that “[p]roof that a debtor’s agent obtains money for fraud does not justify the denial 
of a discharge to the debtor, unless it is accompanied by proof which demonstrates or justifies an inference that 
the debtor knew or should have known of the fraud”); see also Huh, 2014 WL 936803, at *9 (adopting 
requirement creditor prove the debtor “knew or should have known of the fraud” before imputing the fraud of 
the agent to the debtor as principal). 
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debtor benefited from the fraudulent transaction.68 The most significant 
departure from the Strang opinion is seen in two decisions published by the 
Eleventh and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals in 2001 and 2002.69 In these 
decisions, the courts held that even a debt imputed to a debtor under § 20(a) of 
the Securities Exchange Act was dischargeable because imputed liability under 
the Securities Act was more expansive than liability under the common law, 
rendering the Strang opinion inapplicable.70 
By 2002, the pervasive interpretation of § 523(a)(2)(A) was that the statute 
created an exception to discharge “for money, property, services . . . to the 
extent obtained by . . . actual fraud“ of the debtor.71 Thus, although Congress 
adopted § 523(a)(2)(A) to protect victim-claimants from debtors that tricked 
claimants into loaning the debtor money,72 that protection extended only to 
creditors that could make a prima facie case against the debtor for actual fraud 
at common law. It did not extend to any other types of fraud imputed by statute 
 
 68 See HSSM #7 L.P. v. Bilzerian (In re Bilzerian), 100 F.3d 886, 889 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Allison 
v. Roberts (In re Allison), 960 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1992)) (affirming district court decision to deny debtor 
discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A) even though the debtor did not directly benefit from the fraud, the debt was 
still nondischargeable under the receipt of benefits theory because the debtor’s connection to the fraud, “placed 
him in a position to benefit from any infusion of capital to that enterprise”). Although the defendant debtor in 
Bilzerian was found independently guilty of fraud in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, 
the case is illustrative not only of the popularity of the “receipt of benefit” theory incorporated under 
§ 523(a)(2)(A), but also demonstrates that analysis establishing debtor liability for fraud is distinct from 
determining the dischargeability of that very same debt. This case illuminates the additional evidentiary proof 
that must be provided by the plaintiff creditor in a nondischargeability suit under § 523(a)(2)(A), because the 
Eleventh Circuit decision analyzed the plaintiff-creditor’s collateral estoppel claim independently from the 
dischargeability claim. Id. at 889–93; see BancBoston Mortg. Corp. v. Ledford (In re Ledford), 970 F.2d 1556, 
1561 (6th Cir. 1992) (adopting analysis of the Fifth Circuit in In re Luce, 960 F.2d 1277 (5th Cir. 1992), to 
affirm the district court’s decision to impute fraud of partner to debtor because “[the debtor] shared in the 
monetary benefits of the fraud”).  
 69 See generally Owens v. Miller (In re Miller), 276 F.3d 424 (8th Cir. 2002); Hoffend v. Villa (In re 
Villa), 261 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 70 See Miller, 276 F.3d at 429 (agreeing with Villa court that Strang “should not be extended beyond its 
basis in agency law to include the much broader sweep of § 20(a) liability”); Villa, 261 F.3d at 1152 (citing 
Brown v. Enstar Grp., Inc., 84 F.3d 393, 396 (11th Cir. 1996)) (declining to extend Strang’s reach from 
agency law to the wider net imposed under § 20(a), which would extend liability to a “controlling person”). 
 71 See Sherman v. SEC (In re Sherman), 658 F.3d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Even though the text of 
the statute does not state that the fraudulent conduct must have been the debtor’s, we have nonetheless 
incorporated that assumption into our understanding of the provision.”), abrogated by Bullock v. 
BankChampaign, N.A.,133 S. Ct. 1754 (2013); see also Ghomeshi v. Sabban (In re Sabban), 600 F.3d 1219, 
1222 (9th Cir. 2010) (listing as the first factor in the § 523(a)(2)(A) analysis that the “debtor made . . . [the] 
representations . . . that at the time he knew they were false”); Nunnery v. Rountree (In re Rountree), 478 F.3d 
215, 219 (4th Cir. 2007) (“A plain reading of this subsection demonstrates that Congress excepted from 
discharge not simply any debt incurred as a result of fraud but only debts in which the debtor used fraudulent 
means to obtain money, property, services, or credit.”). 
 72 See Nunnery, 478 F.3d at 219–20. 
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or common law principles absent additional proof of culpability.73 While this 
interpretation satisfied the Code’s purpose, which is to supply a fresh start to 
the “honest but unfortunate debtor,”74 it also obscured avenues of recovery that 
defrauded investors could pursue to recover stolen funds. 
For example, the limitations on the discharge exception proved particularly 
harsh on creditors who entered settlement agreements with debtors outside of 
court.75 In these instances, the parties that settled allegations of fraud with the 
debtor prior to bankruptcy found themselves struggling to recover payment for 
the settlement, because the agreement explicitly released the debtor from 
liability for fraud in exchange for the settled payment.76 Without litigation 
before a trier of fact, these victims could not establish the elements of actual 
fraud necessary to sustain a claim under § 523(a)(2)(A).77 
Securities regulators faced similar challenges convincing bankruptcy courts 
to except judgments they obtained against fraudulent debtors from discharge. 
 
 73 See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 523.08 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2009).  
To sustain a prima facie case of fraud, a plaintiff under [§] 523(a)(2)(A) must establish that: 1) 
the debtor made the representation; 2) the time of the representation, the debtor knew it to be 
false; 3) the debtor made the representation with the intent and purpose of deceiving the plaintiff; 
4) the plaintiff justifiably relied on the representation; and 5) the plaintiff sustained a loss or 
damage as the proximate consequence of the representation having been made. 
Id.; see also, Treadwell v. Glenstone Lodge, Inc. (In re Treadwell), 637 F.3d 855, 860 (8th Cir. 2011); 
Tummel v. Quinlivan (In re Quinlivan), 434 F.3d 314, 317 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 74 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991) (emphasis added). 
 75 See, e.g., Key Bar Invs. Inc., v. Fischer (In re Fischer), 116 F.3d 388, 390 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing In re 
Kelley, 259 F. Supp. 297 (N.D. Cal. 1965) (holding that an agreement settling allegations of misrepresentation 
during sale of automotive repair shop in exchange for $10,000 was a novation of the original purchase 
contract, and that all claims arising out of the sale of [the repair shop] alleging misrepresentation were 
extinguished by way of the agreement); In re West, 22 F.3d 775, 777 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that a settlement 
agreement between employee and employer providing for the payment of $75,000 in exchange for a general 
release of claims for embezzlement was a novation and substituted a contractual obligation for a tortious one, 
therefore the debt was an unsecured debt on a contract); Archer v. Warner (In re Warner), 283 F.3d 230, 237 
(4th Cir. 2002) (affirming district court’s decision to treat settlement agreement providing $300,000 in 
exchange for release of all pending and future claims against defendants as a novation “substituting a 
dischargeable contract debt for a fraud-based tort claim which may not have been dischargeable”). The 
novation theory adopted by these circuits was eventually rejected in 2003, when the Supreme Court reversed 
the Fourth Circuit’s Archer v. Warner decision. In Archer, the Court looked to reasoning in Brown v. Felsen, 
44 U.S. 127 (1979), to require the Bankruptcy Court to look beyond the agreement to see if the debt settled 
could amount to a “debt for money obtained by fraud, within the terms of the nondischargeability statute.” 
Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 319 (2003).  
 76 See Fischer, 116 F.3d 388; In re West, 22 F.3d 775. But see United States v. Spicer, 57 F.3d 1152, 
1156 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 77 See Fischer, 116 F.3d at 390; In re West, 22 F.3d at 777. 
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Courts often struggled to comport the elements for actionable claims in federal 
security law with the elements for actual fraud required in § 523(a)(2)(A).78 
B. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Adoption of § 523(a)(19) 
The challenges of adjudicating securities fraud within the confines of 
bankruptcy received little attention from Congress until 2001, when the 
collapse of Enron sent stock prices plummeting, and private and public 
investment portfolios lost billions in Enron-related investments.79 In the 
aftermath of the Enron debacle, Congress recognized that limiting the 
exception to cases of actual fraud created loopholes in the law that were too 
forgiving for debtors.80 In 2002, Congress passed SOX, which represented “the 
most extensive crackdown on corporate boardroom fraud since the Depression 
era.”81 SOX sought to: 
[P]rovide for criminal prosecution and enhanced penalties of persons 
who defraud investors in publicly traded securities or alter or destroy 
evidence in certain [f]ederal investigations, to disallow debts incurred 
 
 78 See Owens v. Miller (In re Miller), 276 F.3d 424, 429 (8th Cir. 2002) (refusing to extend § 20(a) 
liability to § 523 because it expands liability to fraudulent acts not made by debtor); Hoffend v. Villa (In re 
Villa), 261 F.3d 1148, 1152 (11th Cir. 2001) (court adopted a narrow reading of Strang); SEC v. Bilzerian (In 
re Bilzerian), 196 B.R. 907, 911 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) (holding that judgment against debtor for violation of 
§10(b) of the Security Exchange Act was dischargeable because the judgment did not meet the loss and 
reliance requirements of § 523(a)(2)(A)), rev’d, 153 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11 Cir. 1993). 
 79 See Murley, supra note 45, at 318. 
Enron misled investors and regulators by using a variety of complicated transactions with 
putatively separate business entities designed to bolster purported profits, conceal actual losses, 
and ultimately boost Enron’s share price. These practices eventually caught up with the company 
and Enron announced a $618 million loss for the third quarter of 2001, reduced shareholder 
equity by $1.2 billion, and later filed the largest bankruptcy in United States history. As a result, 
Enron shareholders were left with virtually worthless stock. . . . In reaction to these events, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act created a new bankruptcy provision, section 523(a)(19), that renders debt 
from judgments for violations of federal or state securities laws and debts incurred through 
common law fraud, deceit, or manipulation in connection with the purchase or sale of a security 
nondischargeable in bankruptcy. 
Id.; see also S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 4 (2002) (referring to the Enron debacle as showing the need for 
legislation); William Hildbold, L.L.M. Thesis, Will Section 1141(d)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code Destroy 
Corporate Chapter 11 Reorganizations by Rendering SEC Claims Non-Dischargeable?, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. 
L. REV. 551, 556–58 (2009). 
 80 See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 10 (“Current bankruptcy law permits wrongdoers to discharge their 
obligations under court judgments or settlements based on securities fraud and other securities violations. This 
loophole in the law should be closed to help defrauded investors recoup their losses and to hold accountable 
those who incur debts by violating our securities laws.”).  
 81 WRAP: Bush Signs Law Cracking Down on Corp. and Acctg. Fraud, DOW JONES INT’L NEWS, July 30, 
2002. 
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in violation of securities fraud laws from being discharged in 
bankruptcy, to protect whistleblowers who report fraud against 
retaliation by their employers, and for other purposes.82 
SOX included an amendment to § 523 to “make judgments and settlements 
arising from state and federal securities law violations brought by state or 
federal regulators and private individuals [nondischargeable].”83 The provision 
subsequently became § 523(a)(19). The language of the statute is as follows: 
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 
1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any 
debt— 
(19) that— 
(A) is for— 
(i) the violation of any of the Federal securities laws (as 
that term is defined in [§] 3(a)(47) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934),84 any of the State securities 
laws, or any regulation or order issued under such 
Federal or State securities laws; or 
(ii) common law fraud, deceit, or manipulation in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security; 
and 
(B) results, before, on, or after the date on which the petition 
was filed, from— 
(i) any judgment, order, consent order, or decree 
entered in any Federal or State judicial or administrative 
proceeding; 
(ii) any settlement agreement entered into by the debtor; 
or 
(iii) any court or administrative order for any damages, 
fine, penalty, citation, restitutionary payment, 
disgorgement payment, attorney fee, cost, or other 
payment owed by the debtor.85 
Since its adoption, courts have struggled to reconcile prior case law 
construing exceptions to discharge with the new statutory provisions.86 One 
 
 82 S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 2. 
 83 Id. at 12. 
 84 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(47), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(47) (2012) (Section 3(a)(47) of the 
Securities Exchange Act includes the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, the Investment Company Act of 1940, the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, and the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970). 
 85 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19) (2012). 
 86 Compare Owens v. Miller (In re Miller), 276 F.3d 424, 429 (8th Cir. 2002) (imputing a third party’s 
fraud to an innocent debtor by §20(a) was an overextension of Supreme Court’s reasoning in Strang v. 
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such anomaly exists in cases where the debtor has not personally violated any 
of the state or federal securities laws, but unlawfully benefited through the 
fraudulent activity of another.87 In such instances, regulators face the difficulty 
of convincing the bankruptcy court that liability for a violation of a security 
law, and subsequent liability for a debt, can be imputed to a debtor that has 
unlawfully benefited from the fraudulent activity of another.88 The compelling 
question at stake in these instances is whether the debt can be properly 
excepted from discharge as a debt “for the violation” of securities laws as 
provided in § 523(a)(19).89 
C. Competing Constructions of § 523(a)(19) 
Before embarking on a thorough analysis of the statute, it is prudent to 
acknowledge existing scholarly attitudes towards § 523(a)(19). Currently, there 
are two competing interpretations of the statute. 
The group referred to here as “literalists” argue for a substantive 
comparison of § 523(a)(19) to other exceptions in § 523. Such a comparison, 
the literalists argue, favors a broad interpretation of the statute that embraces 
exception to discharge for debts imputed to a debtor who is not directly liable 
for violations of securities laws.90 Proponents of the literalist interpretation of 
§ 523(a)(19) construe the provision to except all debts arising from the 
violation of a state or federal securities law.91 
 
Bradner, 114 U.S. 555 (1885), and therefore the debt was dischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A)), and Hoffend v. 
Villa (In re Villa), 261 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2001) (relying on Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 70 (1877), and Strang v. 
Bradner 114 U.S. 555 (1885), to determine that fraud imputed to debtor through § 20(a) of the Securities 
Exchange Act is not excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A) and that “an exception for § 20(a) liability 
should come from Congress and not the judiciary”), with Cordius Trust v. Kummerfeld (In re Kummerfeld), 
444 B.R. 28, 36–40, 43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (appropriating the Supreme Court’s analysis of § 523(a)(2)(A) 
in Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979), and Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314 (2003), to justify inquiry into 
underlying grounds for allegations of securities law violations to determine that judgment debt, which resulted 
from settlement of lawsuit and fraud in the sale of a securities, was nondischargeable under §523(a)(19)). 
 87 See generally Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Wilcox, 691 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding 
state-court judgment against debtor, requiring them to repay profits obtained through Ponzi scheme, was not 
excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(19)).  
 88 Contra id. at 1175–76 (explaining that “[C]ongress intended to penalize the perpetrators of such 
schemes by denying them relief from their debts”) (emphasis added). 
 89 Id. at 1173–74; Sherman v. SEC (In re Sherman), 658 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2011) (Fisher, J., 
dissenting), abrogated by Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754 (2013). 
 90 Keith N. Sambur, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s Effect on Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code: Are All 
Securities Laws Debts Really Nondischargeable?, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 561, 562, 568–69 (2003) 
(citations omitted). 
 91 Id. at 562 (citing John C. Coffee, Jr., A Brief Tour of the Major Reforms in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 97 
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 151, 174–75 (2002)). 
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In contrast, “narrow constructivists” like to categorize § 523 exceptions in 
two separate groups: a “conduct exception,” which prevents discharge when 
the debtor engages in reprehensible behavior; and a “type exception” which 
denies discharge when there is a “strong government interest in the continued 
liability [of the debtor].”92 Typically, type exceptions advance a “government 
interest.”93 Narrow constructivists argue that § 523(a)(19) is a conduct 
exception, requiring the proven culpability of the debtor before discharge of 
the debt can be denied. The narrow constructivist approach presupposes that 
§ 523(a)(19) could not be a type exception because there is no government 
interest in reinforcing the efforts of state and federal security regulators to 
ameliorate the devastation of securities fraud.94 
However, willful oblivion to the government’s interest in ensuring proper 
regulation of the securities markets has since fallen out of vogue. In the wake 
of financial crises like Enron, WorldCom, and Adelphi, it is more evident than 
ever that the government has a significant interest in helping defrauded 
investors recover lost assets, and reinforce the authority of securities regulators 
by ensuring no party unlawfully gains from fraud.95 
II. REVISITING THE OPINIONS OF THE NINTH AND TENTH CIRCUIT COURTS 
A. A Summary of Arguments in Sherman and Faught 
The dueling analysis of § 523 exceptions is manifest in the majority and 
dissenting opinions of the Ninth Circuit in In re Sherman and the Tenth Circuit 
in Oklahoma Department of Securities, ex. rel. Faught v. Wilcox. In Sherman 
v. SEC (In re Sherman), the Ninth Circuit considered the discharge of an 
 
 92 See id. at 564, 566–67 (citations omitted). Narrow constructivists argue that when a creditor cannot 
prove any reprehensible conduct on the part of the debtor, the exceptions should not be construed to deny 
discharge to the innocent. Id. at 564–65. Alternatively, if the exception falls under the type exceptions then the 
debtor’s conduct is irrelevant. Id. at 566–67. 
 93 Id. at 567 (citation omitted). Examples of such interests include exceptions for discharge of student 
loans in bankruptcy. The author explains: “Because the federal government backs or insures student loans, the 
student loan exception protects financial interests of the government and the economic viability of the 
country’s higher education system.” Id. 
 94 See id. at 568 (explaining that there is no clear government interest served from excluding discharge of 
“innocent victims” of securities fraud). 
 95 148 CONG. REC. S6327-06 (daily ed. July 8, 2002) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes) (relying on article by 
Alex Burton for the statement that Enron, Adelphia and WorldCom have all been facing investigations for 
serious misstatements in their financial reports); Alex Burton, Tweaking Numbers To Meet Goals Comes Back 
To Haunt Executives, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/29/business/ 
tweaking-numbers-to-meet-goals-comes-back-to-haunt-executives.html). 
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attorney’s debt owed to the SEC to satisfy a disgorgement order obtained 
against him by a receiver.96 In its decision, the majority held that § 523(a)(19) 
only prevented the discharge of a debt for a securities violation when the 
debtor was responsible for the violation and that construing the exception 
broadly to prohibit the discharge of a disgorgement order, without proving the 
debtor’s culpability for the violation, was inappropriate.97 
A year later, the Tenth Circuit considered the dischargeability of a 
disgorgement debt levied against debtors that had profited from early 
investment in a Ponzi scheme.98 After the Oklahoma Department of Securities 
discovered the scheme, the Department charged the defendants with unjust 
enrichment and obtained summary judgment against the defendants in 
Oklahoma District Court.99 The defendants subsequently declared bankruptcy, 
and the Department brought an action in bankruptcy court to render the debt 
nondischargeable.100 
In both cases, the majority opinions embrace the narrow statutory 
interpretation of § 523(a)(19), restricting the exception from discharge to debts 
that caused the violation of any state or federal securities law by the debtor.101 
Conversely, the dissenting opinions in both cases adopted the literalist 
interpretation of the statute,102 espousing the view that Congress intended to 
 
 96 Sherman v. SEC (In re Sherman), 658 F.3d 1009, 1010 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted), abrogated 
by Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A.,133 S. Ct. 1754 (2013). 
 97 Id. at 1024. In Sherman, the court stated: 
For example, § 523(a)(2)(A) creates an exception to discharge for debts ‘for money, property, 
services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by . . . actual 
fraud.’ Even though the text of the statue does not state that the fraudulent conduct must have been 
the debtor’s, we have nonetheless incorporated that assumption into our understanding of the 
provision. 
Id. at 1014 (citing Ghomeshi v. Sabban (In re Sabban), 600 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2010); Citibank v. 
Eashai (In re Eashai), 87 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
 98 Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Wilcox, 691 F.3d 1171, 1173 (10th Cir. 2012); Okla. Dep’t of 
Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Blair, 231 P.3d 645, 650 (Okla. 2010). The debtors had received payments with money 
obtained from other investors.  
 99 See Blair, 231 P.3d at 650–51. 
 100 Faught, 691 F.3d at 1173. 
 101 See Faught, 691 F.3d at 1175–76 (using the term “narrow construction” to distinguish from a reading 
of the statute that included debtors who were not charged with securities violations); Sherman, 658 F.3d at 
1019. 
 102 See Faught, 691 F.3d at 1182 (Briscoe, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the ordinary meaning of the 
terms “debt”, “for” and “violation”, as used in § 523(a)(19), means “every enforceable obligation of the debtor 
to another that represents or is representative of an infringement or breach of ‘any . . . of the securities laws”); 
Sherman, 658 F.3d at 1019 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (discussing that the majority opinion failed to give effect to 
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“render nondischargeable all debts arising under the securities laws.”103 The 
broader interpretation embraces debts to satisfy a disgorgement action resulting 
from the securities fraud of another. 
1. Majority Opinions and the Argument for a Narrow Construction of 
§ 523(a)(19) 
Although there are significant differences in the facts of each case, the 
majority opinions in Sherman and Faught used many of the same arguments to 
support their conclusions.104 In Sherman the opinion began by recognizing the 
debtor as a “nominal defendant”105 who faced enforcement actions by the SEC 
not because he had committed fraud, but because he held funds in trust that 
were the subject matter of litigation.106 The defendant was an attorney 
representing a group of defendants in a securities enforcement action and 
received funds as an advance of his contingency fee.107 The SEC established 
the attorney did not earn the fee and the court subsequently ordered him to 
return the money in compliance with the California Rules of Professional 
Conduct.108 
The majority opinion did not refute the legitimacy of the disgorgement 
order against the debtor, but instead focused on the dischargeability of the 
claim in bankruptcy.109Writing for the majority, Judge Bybee first sought to 
establish the plain meaning of § 523(a)(19) by investigating the dictionary 
definition of key terms.110 Initially, the analysis focused on determining the 
proper meaning of the word “for” because, as the Judge explained, “[t]he 
question is whether a debt can be ‘for’ one of the violations listed in 
 
the ordinary meaning of § 523(a)(19) by giving alternate meaning to the term “for”, and by reading words into 
the statute). 
 103 See Sambur, supra note 90, at 568 (emphasis added); see also Sabino, supra note 34, at 147–48; 
Coffee, supra note 91, at 174–75 (explaining that because the statute renders nondischargeable judgments, 
resulting from a “violation of any federal securities laws,” creditors can re-characterize transactions). 
 104 See generally Faught, 691 F.3d 1171; Sherman, 658 F.3d 1009. 
 105 Sherman, 658 F.3d at 1012 (citation omitted). Nominal defendants are parties who “[hold] the subject 
matter of the litigation in a subordinate or possessory capacity as to which there is no dispute.” SEC v. Colello, 
139 F.3d 674, 676 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 414 (7th Cir. 1991)). 
 106 Nominal defendants are “not a real party in interest because [they have] no legitimate claim to the 
disputed property.” Sherman 658 F.3d at 1012 (quoting SEC v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130, 1141) (9th Cir. 2007) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 107 Id. at 1015. 
 108 Id. at 1010, 1019. 
 109 Id. at 1012. 
 110 Id. 
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§ 523(a)(19)(A) when the debtor has not committed any of those violations.”111 
After considering the conflicting definitions of the term in various dictionaries, 
the opinion concluded that the “plain language of the statute alone [did] not 
clearly resolve the interpretive question before [the court].”112 
The opinion then examined one of the chief arguments proffered by the 
securities regulators in favor of a literalist interpretation of the statute.113 The 
SEC argued that in the “absence of any explicit textual indication that the 
underlying violation must be committed by the debtor . . . [t]he exception must 
be given its broadest natural reading.”114 The court rejected this argument, 
reasoning that such a limitation could be read into § 523(a)(19) because the 
same limitation has been read into many other discharge exceptions that lacked 
explicit language.115 
After concluding that an examination of the text and structure of the statute 
was unsatisfying, the Sherman court found that rules of statutory construction 
adopted by the Supreme Court favored the narrow interpretation.116 Chief 
among them the rule that “[i]n determining whether a particular debt falls 
within one of the exceptions of § 523, the statute should be strictly construed 
against the objecting creditor and liberally in favor of the debtor.”117 
Finally, the opinion determined that the legislative history of the statute 
indicated that Congress intended to “target those parties who are guilty of 
securities violations, in order to ensure that judgments for securities violations 
are treated, in bankruptcy, like judgments for fraud.”118 This interpretation 
countered the interpretation proffered by the SEC emphasizing Congressional 
intent to have the exception “further the independently important goals of 
punishment and compensation.”119 
 
 111 Id. The definitions for the word “for” considered by the Judge included, “[a]s the price of, or the 
penalty on account of”; “[i]n requital of”; or “[i]n order to obtain”; and “[i]n consequence of, by reason of, as 
the effect of.” Id. at 1012–13 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
 112 Id.  
 113 Id. (“The government encourages us to focus on the absence of any explicit textual indication that the 
underlying violation must be committed by the debtor.”). 
 114 Id. The court initially recognized the validity of this argument, conceding that a number of the 
discharge exceptions in § 523 specifically target debts resulting from the conduct of the debtor. Id. at 1013 (9th 
Cir. 2011). 
 115 Id. at 1014 (stating that interpreting the statute broadly would extend the discharge exceptions to the 
“honest but unfortunate debtor”). 
 116 Id. at 1015. 
 117 Id. (quoting 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 523.05 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 2009)). 
 118 Id. at 1016. 
 119 Id. 
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In Faught, the Tenth Circuit considered whether debtors could discharge 
their obligation to disgorge funds the debtors received as payments from 
investment in a Ponzi scheme.120 In its reasoning, the circuit court recycled 
many of the same arguments presented by the Ninth Circuit in Sherman, 
eventually holding that the debtor’s obligation to pay securities regulators was 
dischargeable.121 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that the failure to charge the 
debtors with a security violation precluded any attempt to except the debt from 
discharge under § 523(a)(19).122 
2. Dissenting Opinions and the Argument for a Broad Interpretation of 
§ 523(a)(19) 
In his dissent from the Sherman court, Judge Fisher took issue with the 
majority’s interpretation of the statute’s plain meaning.123 Judge Fisher 
believed that the statute plainly used the preposition “for” to mean, “‘because 
of,’ ‘on account of,’ ‘as a result of,’ [or] ‘having (the thing mentioned) as a 
reason or cause.’”124 Like most literalists, Fisher countered the majority’s 
interpretation by arguing that using “for” to connote causation gave the terms 
in the statute the most ordinary and natural meaning, and that when such 
meaning does not lead to an absurd outcome, it should be chosen.125 Therefore, 
Fisher concluded, Congress’s chosen words should not be “softened.”126 
In his dissent from the Tenth Circuit majority in Faught, Judge Briscoe also 
attacked the majority’s interpretation of the statute’s plain meaning and 
legislative history predating § 523(a)(19).127 Judge Briscoe reasoned that the 
definition of “debt,” supplied in the Code itself,128 coupled with the common 
 
 120 Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Wilcox, 691 F.3d 1171, 1172–73 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 121 Id. at 1176–77. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Sherman, 658 F.3d at 1019 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
 124 Id. (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). 
 125 Id. (citations omitted) (quotations omitted). 
 126 Id.; see also Faught, 691 F.3d at 1181 (Briscoe, C.J., dissenting) (“Statutory construction must begin 
with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language 
accurately expresses the legislative purpose.”). 
 127 Faught, 691 F.3d at 1181–82 (Briscoe, C.J., dissenting). 
 128 Id. at 1181 (alteration in original) (quoting Penn. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 
559 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 218 (1998)) (“The 
word debt is defined in the Code as liability on a claim, § 101(12), a claim is defined . . . as a right to payment, 
§ 101(5)(A), and a right to payment, [the Supreme Court has] said, is nothing more nor less than an 
enforceable obligation.”). 
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meaning of the word “for,”129 produced an interpretation of the statute that 
easily embraced “every enforceable obligation of the debtor to another that 
represents or is representative of,” a violation of federal or state securities 
laws.130 Judge Briscoe found support for his interpretation in the 2002 
Congressional Record detailing the purpose of SOX.131 The Judge pointed out 
that “the overall focus of that Act . . . was to ‘restore [corporate] 
accountability’ by ‘provid[ing] prosecutors with new and better tools to 
effectively prosecute and punish those who defraud our nation’s 
investors . . . .’”132 The Judge believed that the restrictive interpretation offered 
by the majority threatened this express purpose and essentially permitted a 
windfall to wily debtors.133 
Ultimately, the dueling analyses at play in these opinions demonstrates that 
courts should be wary of relying too heavily on the statutory construction of 
either camp. The discussion reveals the futility of ascertaining any single, 
proper “plain meaning,” and the insufficiency of plain meaning doctrine to 
produce a reliable statutory interpretation.134 The conflicting results of 
statutory analysis conducted by opposing sides should destroy confidence in 
the plain meaning analysis of either party.135 
 
 129 See id. (citation omitted) (“In turn, the word ‘for’ means ‘representing’ or ‘as representative of.’”). 
 130 Id. at 1181–82. 
 131 Id. at 1182. 
 132 Id. at 1181 (alteration in original) (quoting Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 
§ 803(3), 116 Stat. 745). 
 133 Id. at 1182–83. 
As I see it, it is entirely consistent with the Act to treat as nondischargeable any debts that arose 
from violations of federal or state securities law, regardless of whether or not the debtor was 
personally involved in those violations. Indeed, to hold otherwise would result in a windfall to 
the debtor. 
Id. 
 134 See Eric S. Lasky, Note, Perplexing Problems with Plain Meaning, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 891, 909–10 
(1999). Lasky demonstrates that problems with accepting the “plain meaning” include the assumption that 
Congress could at any time have a single intended meaning for every word that is uses, and that it is difficult to 
determine which meaning is “plain.” Id. at 910. 
 135 See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 521–35 (1960). For 
similar reasons, the narrow constructivist arguments regarding the legislative history of § 523(a)(19) are also 
suspect. In the brief prepared by appellants in Sherman, counsel argued that statements made throughout the 
legislative record demonstrated Congressional intent to prevent “wrongdoers” from profiting through 
bankruptcy. See Brief For Appellant at 26, Sherman v. SEC (In re Sherman), 658 F.3d 1009 (2011) (No. 09-
55880) (quoting S. REP. NO. 107-146 at 12 (2002)) (“Current bankruptcy law may permit such wrongdoers to 
discharge their obligations under court judgments or settlements based on securities fraud and other securities 
violations.”). However, the brevity with which Congress adopted the legislation left few statements or reports 
to corroborate this claim. A subsequent paragraph of the same report cited by the appellants suggests that 
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Moreover, there are relevant facts in Faught that distinguish it from the 
Sherman opinion. For example, the debtor in Sherman held funds that he had 
received but not earned as a contingency fee for defending clients in an 
enforcement action brought by the SEC.136 The court easily calculated the 
amount the debtor was responsible for disgorging and the judgment was 
enforced under the California Rules of Professional Conduct—not a state or 
federal security law.137 This is different from the debt owed to the state 
securities regulators in Faught, where the disgorgement was an estimation of 
the profits the investor gained from the Ponzi scheme in the form of payments 
drawn from many commingled accounts.138 Furthermore, the debtors in Faught 
had a direct interest in the funds that were the subject of the original SEC 
enforcement suit against the Ponzi organizer, rather than an interest in separate 
funds set aside for the purpose of litigation, as in Sherman.139 While the 
Faught opinion relies on Sherman as authority for the limitation on the scope 
of the discharge exception,140 the opinion of Judge O’Brien fails to address 
important distinctions between the respective debt obligations that would 
render the Tenth Circuit’s reliance on Sherman dicta inappropriate. 
B. Problems with Majority Interpretation of Innocent Debtor 
In addition to the conflicting constructions of “plain meaning,” the majority 
opinions of Sherman and Faught fail to fully address important doctrinal 
differences between § 523(a)(2)(A) and § 523(a)(19). This Section addresses 
two important distinctions that dissuade from the adoption of a narrow 
statutory construction by demonstrating that the narrow construction arbitrarily 
excludes debts that meet the statutory requirements of § 523(a)(19). Namely, 
this section takes issue with the Sherman majority’s conflation of claims for 
 
Congress intended the amendment to help state securities regulators, “[b]y ensuring [that] securities law 
judgments and settlements in state cases are [nondischargeable] . . . .” S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 16. This 
statement makes no distinction between judgments against violators or non-violators and suggests that 
Congress intended the provision to apply broadly. See id. Moreover, there is commentary sufficient to suggest 
that this was how the final language in § 523(a)(19) was expected to operate. See C. Thomas Mason, 
Nondischargeable in Bankruptcy: Investors Claims Against Brokers After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
PRACTICING L. INST., 467 (August 2003). Courts have also suggested this. See Faught, 691 F.3d at 1182–83 
(Briscoe, C.J., dissenting) (“To the extent that the legislative history is relevant, it is . . . more supportive of my 
interpretation than the majority’s.”). But see Sabino, supra note 34, at 147–48. 
 136 Sherman v. SEC (In re Sherman), 658 F.3d 1009, 1010 (9th Cir. 2011), abrogated by Bullock v. 
BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754 (2013). 
 137 Id. 
 138 See Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Blair, 231 P.3d 645, 649–50 (Okla. 2010). 
 139 Sherman, 658 F.3d at 1010; Blair, 231 P.3d at 649–50. 
 140 Faught, 691 F.3d at 1176.  
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dischargeability arising under § 523(a)(2) without acknowledging that a 
disgorgement order levied against a debtor is different from a contractual debt 
procured through fraud and that § 523(a)(19) contains specific attribution 
language that the majority opinions wholly ignore. This Section also attempts 
to illuminate the variety of instances in which an order for disgorgement may 
arise against the debtor in an effort to demonstrate that debtor culpability for 
securities violations is an inappropriate precondition to the application of 
§ 523(a)(19). 
1. Bringing a Cause of Action Under § 523(a)(19) 
One particular problem with the majority reasoning in Sherman and Faught 
resides in the opinions’ conflation of a cause of action for actual fraud under 
§ 523(a)(2)(A) with a cause of action for violation of a securities law under 
§ 523(a)(19). In Sherman, the SEC argued that the lack of any explicit 
language in § 523(a)(19), requiring the debtor to violate securities laws, 
permitted a broad interpretation of the exception that covered debts for which 
the debtor was not directly liable.141 In response, the court reasoned that 
interpreting the provision as the government regulators suggested would lead 
to absurd results and inappropriately deny the “honest but unfortunate debtor” 
the full relief of the bankruptcy process.142 To illustrate, Judge Bybee used the 
following example of outcomes under § 523(a)(2)(A): 
[S]uppose [the Court] had not construed § 523(a)(2)(A) to apply only 
in those cases where the debtor committed fraud. Suppose, further, 
that a bank loaned money to an innocent person under the express 
condition that the loan be guaranteed by a third party who had greater 
assets. If the third party lies about his assets in order to qualify to be 
the guarantor, then the borrower will have, in effect, obtained 
‘money . . . by . . . false pretenses, a false representation, or actual 
fraud,’ even if she did not know or have reason to know about the 
guarantor’s misconduct. If she is subsequently unable to repay her 
loan and is driven to bankruptcy, we think it would contravene the 
“fresh start” purposes of the system to deny her a discharge on the 
basis of a third party’s misconduct.143 
 
 141 Sherman, 658 F.3d at 1013 (“Essentially, the government supports a bright-line interpretive rule: if the 
text of a discharge exception does not contain the limiting words ‘by the debtor’ (or equivalent language), then 
the exception must be given its broadest natural meaning.”). 
 142 See id. at 1014–15 (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)).  
 143 Id. 
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While this example illustrates the majority’s policy reasons for rejecting the 
government’s broad interpretation, it glosses over important procedural 
distinctions that make this a poor example of why a narrow construction of 
§ 523(a)(19) is inappropriate. The real reason that the hypothetical debtor in 
Judge Bybee’s example could escape the discharge exception under 
§ 523(a)(2)(A) is because the statute prohibits the discharge of a debt “to the 
extent obtained by . . . false pretenses, false representations or actual fraud.”144 
The Judge’s scenario loses sight of this nuance when it assumes that the 
creditor (in this case the bank that extended the loan) would pursue an action 
for fraud against the individual that signed the promissory note. Rather, the 
promissory note signed by the debtor merely establishes a contractual debt 
between the debtor and the bank that is fully dischargeable in bankruptcy. Any 
energy spent by the bank attempting to except the debt under § 523(a)(2)(A) 
would be futile because the signor of the promissory note never made a 
fraudulent representation. 
Rather, the party that faces the creditor’s challenge to discharge is the 
guarantor that made the false representations. Unlike the signor of the 
promissory note to the bank, the guarantor has made false representations that 
afford the bank-creditor the opportunity to challenge the dischargeability of the 
debt because the guarantor’s debt was a debt obtained through actual fraud. 
The language of § 523(a)(2)(A) essentially presupposes what the majority 
opinion sought to prove: that without imputing actual fraud to the debtor, no 
creditor can expect to except a debt from discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A). 
Analyzing this same scenario under § 523(a)(19) leads to a different result. 
The language in § 523(a)(2)(A) that references debts “to the extent obtained 
by . . . actual fraud”145 relegates that exception to those debts produced from a 
claim for actual fraud levied by the creditor. No such similar language appears 
in § 523(a)(19).146 Rather, § 523(a)(19) should except from discharge debts for 
securities violations that are attributable directly to the debtor as well as debts 
resulting from a securities violation that is not attributable to the debtor. A 
quick comparison of § 523(a)(19)(A) and § 523(a)(19)(B) supports this 
conclusion. 
 
 144 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).  
 145 Id. (emphasis added).  
 146 See generally id. § 523(a)(19) (excepting from discharge “any debt . . . that . . . is for . . . the violation 
of the Federal Securities laws . . . and of the State securities laws, or any regulation or order issued under such 
Federal or State securities laws”). 
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Section 523(a)(19)(A) provides that a discharge under chapter 7, 11, 12 or 
13 “does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt that is for the 
violation of any of the Federal securities laws.”147 The majority opinions of 
Sherman and Faught insert a limitation in § 523(a)(19)(A) that narrows the 
exception to include only those debts incurred by the debtor’s violation of a 
securities law.148 The interpretation posited by the majority opinions would 
thus constrict § 523(a)(19)(A) in much the same manner that § 523(a)(2)(A) is 
restricted—as an exception that covers only debts that are imputed directly to 
the debtor.149 But such an interpretation ignores additional criteria that qualify 
the debt for exception under § 523(a)(19)(B). Part (B) provides that the debt 
excepted from discharge be a debt that inter alia, “results . . . from . . . any 
court or administrative order for any damages, . . . disgorgement payment, 
attorneys fee, cost, or other payment owed by the debtor.”150 Read in comport 
with § 523(a)(19)(A), the language in § 523(a)(19)(B) suggests that in a 
dischargeability suit under § 523(a)(19), the creditor is not required to prove 
the debtor’s liability for a securities violation to qualify the debt for exception 
from discharge. Rather, the language of Part (B) brings within the ambit of  
§ 523(a)(19) debts owed by the debtor that result from such violations.151 By 
its own terms, the language of § 523(a)(19) specifies only that the resulting 
disgorgement payment be attributable to the debtor.152 Notwithstanding the 
opinions of Faught and Sherman, no such additional requirement that the 
violation be attributable to the debtor is articulated in the statute. 
This alternative interpretation to § 523(a)(19) renders the debtor-guarantor 
scenario contemplated by the Sherman opinion inappropriate. Although Judge 
Bybee created the scenario to illustrate the absurdity of preserving a 
contractual debt against a debtor that was not liable for actual fraud, the Judge 
mistakenly assumed that the avenue for nondischargeability asserted by the 
creditor under § 523(a)(2)(A) would be the same for a debt for a disgorgement 
in § 523(a)(19). The key distinction between § 523(a)(19) and the claim 
against the debtor in § 523(a)(2)(A), is that the debtor in § 523(a)(19) does not 
 
 147 Id. § 523(a)(19)(A).  
 148 See Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Wilcox, 691 F.3d 1171, 1177 (10th Cir. 2012); Sherman, 658 
F.3d at 1019. 
 149 See generally Faught, 691 F.3d at 1176–77 (holding that as the debtors were never charged with 
violation of any securities law, the debt for disgorgement was dischargeable); Sherman, 658 F.3d at 1014 
(using § 523(a)(2)(A) as an example of a statute that incorporates the assumption that the debt must be that of 
the debtor without stating so explicitly). 
 150 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19)(B)(iii) (emphasis added).  
 151 See id. 
 152 See id.  
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owe a contractual debt to the creditor, but has liability for a disgorgement, 
which is a debt entirely unlike the contractual debt incurred by the signor of a 
promissory note. A disgorgement is an equitable remedy that affords the court 
the discretion to deprive defendants of proceeds from fraud.153 The language of 
§ 523(a)(19) specifically allows for “disgorgement payments . . . owed by the 
debtor” to be excepted from statutory discharge.154 It does not identify to 
whom the underlying violation for securities fraud must be imputed. Thus, a 
debtor liable for a contractual debt secured by the fraud of a third party should 
be treated differently in § 523 than a debtor who owes a debt pursuant to a 
disgorgement order. Contrary to the reasoning of the court, the prevailing issue 
in enforcing the § 523(a)(19) exception is not the debtor’s culpability for 
violating securities laws, but rather who is responsible for the debt attributable 
to that violation. Regardless of any culpable activity of the debtor, § 523(a)(19) 
addresses the obligation of the debtor to satisfy a disgorgement order—and the 
statute clearly states that such an obligation is excepted from discharge.155 
Such a construction of the distinct language in § 523(a)(19)(A) and (B) 
resolves another problem with the plain meaning of the statute proffered by the 
Faught and Sherman majorities. By incorporating “by the debtor” into the 
reading of § 523(a)(19), the courts conflict with a cannon of statutory 
interpretation established by the Supreme Court in Keene Corp. v. United 
States.156 In Keene Corp., the Supreme Court held: “[W]here Congress 
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in 
another . . ., it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and 
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”157 To construe the statute in 
the manner that the majority describes not only disregards this cannon of 
construction, but also invites dissonance in the adjudication of § 523(a)(19) 
nondischargeability claims. 
2. Establishing Debtor Culpability for Violations of State Securities Laws 
Similar to the majority in Sherman, the Faught majority reasoned that as 
the debtors were never formally prosecuted for a securities law violation, the 
disgorgement order obtained by the Oklahoma Department of Securities was 
not a debt for the violation of federal securities laws, such as would be 
 
 153 See 69A AM. JUR. 2D, Sec. Regulation—Federal § 1616 (2013).  
 154 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19)(B)(iii) (emphasis added).  
 155 Id. 
 156 Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993). 
 157 Id. (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1993)).  
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excepted under § 523(a)(19).158 As Judge O’Brien wrote in his opinion, 
“Although the Department claims these debtors are not innocent parties, it 
declined to prosecute them for securities laws violations. Had it done so 
successfully, any judgment it obtained would no doubt be considered 
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(19).”159 
The problem with this statement is that it mischaracterizes the nature of the 
debt imposed on the debtors by the Oklahoma state courts. A brief examination 
into the procedural history of the case would have revealed that the debtors 
seeking relief in Faught were not innocent debtors, and that the equitable relief 
sought by the Department was authorized by the Oklahoma Uniform Securities 
Act.160 
 
 158 Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Wilcox, 691 F.3d 1171, 1176 (10th Cir. 2012); Sherman v. SEC 
(In re Sherman), 658 F.3d 1009, 1019 (9th Cir. 2011), abrogated by Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. 
Ct. 1754 (2013). 
 159 Faught, 691 F.3d at 1176. 
 160 See Okla. Dept. of Sec. ex rel Faught v. Blair, 231 P.3d 645, 658 (Okla. 2010) (holding that § 1-603 of 
the Act provides authority for the Department of Securities to bring an action against innocent investors in a 
Ponzi scheme and that the Oklahoma District Court has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate competing 
claims of ownership of funds that were part of an investment scheme). The procedural history of the Faught 
decision is as follows: from December 1999 to October 2004, Marsha Schubert operated a Ponzi scheme 
disguised as an investment firm known as Schubert & Associates. Id. at 650. After discovery of the Ponzi 
scheme, the Oklahoma Department of Securities brought an action against 158 people that profited from the 
Ponzi scheme. Id. The Department’s Petition asserted claims against the defendants on grounds of unjust 
enrichment. Id. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department. Id. The Oklahoma 
Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgments. Id. at 648. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma granted certiorari. 
Id. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the Oklahoma Uniform Securities Act granted the Department 
authority to bring an action against innocent investors in a Ponzi scheme. Id. at 658. The Court also agreed 
with the Department that a Ponzi-scheme profit received by an innocent investor may represent unjust 
enrichment, but rejected the existence of an equitable right to restitution of the funds acquired through the 
scheme. Id. at 663. The Court instead determined that a claim for unjust enrichment against innocent investors 
was “appropriate only if the early investors had received an unreasonable rate of return.” Faught, 691 F.3d at 
1173 n.3. The Court explained: “Our holding is based upon the principle that the Department possesses a 
public interest in seeking restitution for investors who did not receive the return of their initial investment, and 
that the Department’s unjust enrichment claim is brought against investors who received unreasonable high 
dividends in a Ponzi-scheme.” Blair, 231 P.3d at 663.  
On remand, the trial judge granted summary judgment for the Department and found that the Wilcoxes 
were liable for unjust enrichment, and that by virtue of their participation in Schubert’s check-kiting scheme, 
the Wilcoxes were not “innocent investors.” Okla. Dept. of Sec. ex rel Faught v. Wilcox, 267 P.3d 106, 109 
(Okla. 2011). As the Wilcoxes were not “innocent”, the trial court reasoned that the standard adopted in Blair 
regarding the demonstration of an unreasonable rate of return did not apply. Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court 
of Oklahoma affirmed the trial court determination that the Wilcoxes were not “innocent” investors as would 
require the application of Blair, and that therefore it would be inequitable to allow the Wilcoxes to keep any of 
the profits collected from the Ponzi scheme. Id. at 111.  
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Under the Oklahoma securities laws, the Oklahoma Department of 
Securities may bring an action against a person that: 1) has engaged or is about 
to engage in an act or practice that violates the Oklahoma Uniform Securities 
Act of 2004; 2) violates a rule or order of the act constituting a dishonest or 
unethical practice; 3) has engaged in an art, practice or course of business that 
materially aids a violation of the act, a rule, or order, or that constitutes a 
dishonest or unethical practice.161 The law further allows the court to issue, 
upon a proper showing, an injunction or order another type of ancillary relief 
that the court deems appropriate.162 The power of the Department of Securities 
to seek prohibitory injunctions includes orders of disgorgement.163 As such, the 
laws of Oklahoma permit disgorgement only when the individual holding the 
funds offends the rules, orders, or provisions of the state securities laws.164 
Thus, the order for disgorgement entered by an Oklahoma court in their 
discretion presupposes a demonstration that there has been a proper showing of 
an infraction against the state securities laws. Illustrative of this point is the 
reasoning in Oklahoma Department of Securities ex rel. Faught v. Blair, 
predecessor to the Tenth’s Circuit’s opinion.165 
In Blair, the Oklahoma Supreme Court determined the scope of the 
equitable relief sought by the Oklahoma Department of Securities.166 The court 
initially rejected the Department’s argument that the Oklahoma Uniform 
Securities Act conferred authority on the Department to seek disgorgement 
action against innocent investors.167 The Department based its argument on a 
case previously decided by the Oklahoma Supreme Court demonstrating that  
§ 1-603 permitted the Department to seek restitution from innocent 
investors.168 The Blair court differentiated the precedent by emphasizing that a 
 
 161 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1-603 (West 2014).  
 162 Id.  
 163 See State ex rel. Day v. Sw. Mineral Energy, Inc., 617 P.2d 1334, 1338 (Okla. 1980).  
 164 Furthermore Oklahoma case law incorporates liability for fraud under a theory of “constructive fraud” 
which “has the very same legal consequence as actual fraud” and imposes liability on the defendant even 
though there was no intent to deceive. See Faulkenberry v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 602 P.2d 203, 206 (Okla. 
1979). The court explained that constructive fraud does not require an intent to deceive, and that liability for 
constructive fraud may be based on negligent or even innocent misrepresentation. Id. at 206 n.8 (citing U.S. 
Fibres v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 499, aff’d, 509 F.2d 1043, 1047 (6th Cir. 1975)). 
 165 See generally Blair, 231 P.3d at 654 n.16.  
 166 Id. at 668.  
 167 See id. at 653.  
 168 Id. The court was referring to Day, 617 P.2d 1334. In Day, the court held that the Administrator of the 
Department of Securities has the power to seek mandatory as well as prohibitory injunctions, including orders 
of “disgorgement,” against violators of the Oklahoma Securities Act. Id. at 1338.  
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disgorgement is a remedy rewarded by courts in equity “to deprive the 
wrongdoer of his ill-gotten gain.”169 However, the court also recognized that 
the distinguishing characteristic behind a disgorgement action and an action for 
restitution resided in the express purpose of restitution, which is to 
“compensate victims of the securities fraud for their losses,” while the action 
for disgorgement was an exercise of the state’s police and regulatory powers in 
furtherance of the public interest.170 
Although the Department argued that an innocent investor is unjustly 
enriched by profits obtained through a Ponzi scheme as a matter of law and 
should be liable for restitution for all of the profits received,171the Blair court 
reasoned that the claim for unjust enrichment requires demonstration that the 
“party against whom the relief is sought has engaged in wrongful conduct.”172 
However, the court recognized that under the common law of Oklahoma, the 
Department can prove that possession of profits of a Ponzi-scheme investment 
is per se an act of wrongdoing if the innocent investor has not exchanged 
“reasonably equivalent value.”173 Ultimately, the court’s analysis concluded 
that the statutory authority of the Department embraced the right to seek relief 
against Ponzi investors who received profits that were “artificially high” 
because the “Department possesses a public interest in seeking restitution for 
investors who did not receive the return of their investment.”174 
 
 169 Blair, 231 P.3d at 654 (quoting SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing SEC v. 
Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 1978))).  
 170 Id. at 654–55 (emphasis added).  
 171 Id. at 658.  
 172 Id. at 659. The court notes that this is an element to the claim for unjust enrichment “which does not 
receive uniform treatment by courts” and that the “elements of unjust enrichment claims differ markedly from 
state to state.” Id. (citations omitted).  
 173 Id. The court based its conclusion on a line of cases adjudicating suits to recover payments to investors 
pursuant to the fraudulent transfer provisions of the Code. Id. at 660–61. The court found persuasive dicta 
holding that while a transfer is avoidable “if the debtor made the transfer ‘without receiving reasonably 
equivalent value in exchange for the transfer,’” such reasonably equivalent value is received if the innocent 
investor received interest pursuant to a contractual obligation of the investor. Id. at 661 (citations omitted). The 
court ultimately applied the reasoning to a claim in equity for restitution holding that it was inequitable to 
grant relief against Ponzi-investors who received a profit without a showing that the profits received are 
artificially high. Id. at 663. With a nod toward the justification for awarding full restitution of profits in equity, 
Chief Justice Edmondson noted: “We are aware that [Ponzi schemes] may create a significant hardship when 
an innocent investor . . . is informed that he must disgorge profits he earned innocently, often years after the 
money has been received and spent. Nevertheless, courts have long held that it is more equitable to attempt to 
distribute all recoverable assets among the defrauded investors who did not recover their initial investments 
rather than to allow the losses to rest where they fall.” Id. at 661 (citing Scholes v. Lehman, 56 F.3d 750, 757 
(7th Cir. 1995)).  
 174 Id. at 663. 
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Thus, the Blair opinion establishes that to the extent that the profits 
exceeded the reasonable returns on an investment, the state law and common 
law impose the debtor’s wrongdoing and permit the state security regulators to 
pursue equitable relief for a violation of the State’s security laws.175 As such, 
the Faught opinion does an injustice to the Oklahoma Department of Securities 
by ignoring the analysis supplied by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. As Chief 
Judge Briscoe explained in his dissent: 
Although the state district court did not make any findings that [the 
debtor] was directly involved in the underlying violations of 
Oklahoma state securities laws, it is beyond dispute that the judgment 
entered against [the debtor] was intended to be representative of the 
infringement of Oklahoma state securities laws . . . . Consequently, 
that judgment falls within the scope of § 523(a)(19) . . . .176 
The decision in Blair reveals the potential for troubling inconsistencies in 
the position adopted by the Tenth Circuit in the Faught opinion. In its efforts to 
determine the debtor’s culpability for fraud to support the debt, the court failed 
to consider the nature of a disgorgement debt and the variety in elements of 
proof required by various state courts.177 It is evident from the Oklahoma 
statute that at least one state does not require regulators to prove the 
defendant’s intent to obtain the stolen funds to secure a disgorgement order.178 
As explained by Blair, the Oklahoma Securities Act permitted the Department 
to bring an action against innocent investors in a Ponzi scheme simply by 
receiving the unreasonably high returns on their investment.179 Consequently, 
this distinction problematizes the Faught opinion by demonstrating that the 
Department had not “declin[ed] to prosecute [the debtors] for securities law 
violations,” as Judge O’Brien stated.180 Rather, in exercise of the authority 
granted to them in the Oklahoma Uniform Securities Act, the Department had 
pursued a claim for equitable relief authorized by the Act but for which no 
 
 175 Id. at 648. 
 176 Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Wilcox, 691 F.3d 1171, 1183 (10th Cir. 2012) (Briscoe, C.J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added).  
 177 See Blair, 231 P.3d at 658 (explaining “elements of unjust enrichment claims differ markedly from 
state to state”). 
 178 Faught, 691 F.3d at 1183 (Briscoe, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that a review of the opinion of the 
Oklahoma state court showed that it is of “no legal consequence” that debtors were innocents caught in a 
fraudulent scheme because Oklahoma law does not require intent); see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1-603 
(West 2014). 
 179 Blair, 231 P.3d at 670. 
 180 Faught, 691 F.3d at 1176. 
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proof of a violation was required.181 In this context, Judge O’Brien’s insistence 
on prosecuting debtors for securities violations is under-inclusive of the variety 
of claims that establish an investor’s liability for securities fraud—regardless 
of the debtor’s wrongdoing. 
Anecdotally, upon remand from the Oklahoma Supreme Court, the 
Department returned to the Supreme Court in Oklahoma Department of 
Securities ex rel. Faught v. Wilcox and proved that the defendants and 
subsequent debtors in bankruptcy, Marvin and Pam Wilcox, were actually 
partners with the original violator.182 All justices on the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court concurred in the decision determining that there was no dispute of 
material fact warranting a trial on the trial court’s determination that the 
Wilcoxes were not innocent investors in the Ponzi scheme.183 
III.  ESTABLISHING THE PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS AWARDED IN 
NON-BANKRUPTCY COURT 
The analysis of the proceedings in the Oklahoma state courts poses a 
lingering question concerning the validity of state court judgments adjudicated 
before a bankruptcy court. While the majority opinions in Faught and Sherman 
insist that liability for violations of securities laws must be imputed directly to 
the debtor for the exception to discharge to apply,184 the opinions say nothing 
about lending preclusive effect to the judgments established by state courts. 
While bankruptcy courts generally enjoy exclusive jurisdiction to determine 
the dischargeability of a debt brought under § 523(a)(2),185 recent analysis of 
 
 181 Blair, 231 P.3d at 658–59 (explaining that among the elements for unjust enrichment observed by the 
Oklahoma court, a demonstration of wrongful conduct by the defendant is not universal). 
 182 Okla. Dept. of Sec. ex rel Faught v. Wilcox, 267 P.3d 106, 111 (Okla. 2011).  
 183 Id. The court stated: 
In this case, the trial court determined that there was no dispute as to the material fact that the 
Wilcoxes were not “innocent” investors entitled to the equitable treatment provided to innocent 
investors in Blair. In Blair, we held that the district court had jurisdiction to determine equitable 
claims to ownership of funds that were part of the Ponzi scheme. The trial court in this case 
determined that it would be inequitable to allow the Wilcoxes to keep any of their profits from 
the Ponzi scheme. Having reviewed the evidentiary materials presented to the trial court, we find 
that there is no dispute of material fact justifying trial on this issue.  
Id. 
 184 See Faught, 691 F.3d at 1176; Sherman v. SEC (In re Sherman), 658 F.3d 1009, 1019 (9th Cir. 2011), 
abrogated by Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754 (2013). 
 185 This exclusive jurisdiction is asserted through operation of § 523(c) which is described as delegating to 
the bankruptcy court “exclusive jurisdiction” of nondischargeability claims under § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6). In re 
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§ 523(a)(19) conducted by bankruptcy courts suggests that Congress did not 
intend to grant such exclusive jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts for debts 
brought under § 523(a)(19).186 
Rather, by excluding debts arising under § 523(a)(19) from the debts 
requiring separate determinations of dischargeability under § 523(c),187 
bankruptcy courts share jurisdictions with other federal and state courts that 
will determine dischargeability based on the claims for violations of state and 
federal non-bankruptcy statutes.188 Unlike dischargeability determinations for 
fraudulent debts under § 523(a)(2), “there is no task in the § 523(a)(19) 
determination committed exclusively to the bankruptcy courts,”189 as federal or 
state district courts may determine dischargeability simply by finding whether 
a defendant has violated federal or state securities laws.190 
However, bankruptcy courts disagree on whether § 523(a)(19) grants 
similar co-extensive jurisdiction to determine the debtor’s liability for 
underlying security law violations.191 In In re Chan, Judge Frank, of the 
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, considered an 
 
Chan, 355 B.R. 494, 503 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006) (citing Whitehouse v. LaRoche, 277 F.3d 568, 578 (1st Cir. 
2002); Spilman v. Harley, 656 F.2d 224, 226 (6th Cir. 1981)). 
 186 See Jordan Factor, Making Crooks Pay: The Path to Nondischargeable Securities Judgments, 41 
COLO. LAW., 47, 49 (2012). 
 187 Section 523(c)(1) provides that “the debtor shall be discharged from a kind specified [under 
§ 523(a)(2), (4), or (6)] unless on request of the creditor to whom such debt is owed . . . the court determines 
such debt to be excepted from discharge under [§ 523(a)(2), (4), or (6)].” 11 U.S.C. § 523(c)(1) (2012).  
 188 Chan, 355 B.R. at 503 (“[Another] significant aspect of § 523(a)(19) is that determination of 
dischargeability under the provision is not committed exclusively to the bankruptcy court by 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(c). Other courts, state and federal, have concurrent jurisdiction to determine dischargeability.”); see also, 
Factor, supra note 186.(“Two significant facets of § 523(a)(19) distinguish it from § 523(a)(2), (4), and (6). 
First, the elements of liability and dischargeability are co-extensive under § 523(a)(19), but are distinct in 
(a)(2), (4), and (6). A debtor may be liable for both common law fraud and common law breach of fiduciary 
duty, and yet the [plaintiff] in an adversary proceeding may be unable to prove all the elements required for 
nondischargeability under § 523(a)(4), for example. By contrast, liability for violation of the federal securities 
laws is sufficient, by itself, for nondischargeability under § 523(a)(19). . . . To determine nondischargeability 
under § 523(a)(19), therefore, a court does not interpret and apply elements unique to bankruptcy statutes; 
rather, a court merely determines the elements of liability under federal or state securities statutes or common 
law fraud. A second feature of § 523(a)(19) that distinguishes it from § 523(a)(2),(4) and (6) is that § 523(c)(1) 
does not confer exclusive jurisdiction on bankruptcy courts to determine § 523(a)(19) nondischargeability. 
Rather, ‘[o]ther courts, state and federal, have concurrent jurisdiction to determine dischargeability.’”) 
(citations omitted). 
 189 Factor, supra note 186. 
 190 Id.  
 191 Dicta authored by Judge Frank sitting in the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
and Judge Brown of the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado illustrate the conflicting theories. Faris 
v. Jafari (In re Jafari), 401 B.R. 494, 497 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2009); Chan, 355 B.R. at 503. 
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unsecured creditor’s motion for relief from stay to pursue a claim against the 
debtor for securities fraud in the U.S. District Court.192 Recognizing that the 
creditor’s claims concerned debts that may be nondischargeable under 
§ 523(a)(19), Judge Frank reasoned that the creditor’s motion for relief from 
stay should be denied because language in § 523(a)(19)(B) did not expressly 
“mandate that all liability and dischargeability determinations take place in a 
non-bankruptcy forum.”193 Judge Frank construed the phrase “before, on, or 
after the date on which the petition was filed” appearing in Part (B)194 to 
merely remove a temporal barrier to claims for nondischargeability under 
§ 523(a)(19),195 as it did not relegate determination of liability to non-
bankruptcy courts.196 
In decided opposition to Judge Frank, Judge Brown, of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Court of the District of Colorado, determined in Faris v. Jafari (In 
re Jafari) that § 523(a)(19) does not grant co-extensive jurisdiction to the 
bankruptcy courts to determine the underlying liability for securities 
violation.197 In Jafari, the plaintiffs filed an adversary proceeding against the 
debtor alleging violations of numerous securities laws and requesting that the 
debt resulting from the plaintiffs’ investment be declared nondischargeable.198 
At the time that the plaintiffs filed the adversary proceeding, no pending action 
against the debtor existed in another forum and the plaintiffs had not obtained 
an order or judgment against the debtor.199 Judge Brown began her analysis by 
recognizing that § 523(a)(19) incorporated two independent preconditions to 
 
 192 Chan, 355 B.R. at 496. 
 193 Id. at 504. 
 194 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19)(B) (2012).  
 195 Chan, 355 B.R. at 504. Judge Frank explained:  
The phrase “before, on, or after the date on which the petition was filed” was not added to 
§ 523(a)(19) to provide creditors with an unfettered right to proceed in a nonbankruptcy forum, 
notwithstanding a defendant’s commencement of a bankruptcy case. Rather, the phrase was 
intended to make it clear that a debt arising under the federal securities laws or as a result of 
fraud in connection with the sale of a security may be determined nondischargeable under 
§ 523(a)(19) even if the liability was not fixed prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy 
case. In other words, the phrase was added to the statute to remove a temporal limitation from the 
elements of the § 523(a)(19) discharge exception. 
Id. 
 196 Id. at 505 (“Based on the concurrent jurisdiction which exists, it is perfectly appropriate for either the 
bankruptcy court or another court to make a dischargeability determination under § 523(a)(19).”). 
 197 See Factor, supra note 186, at 50 (discussing Judge Brown’s opinion in Faris v. Jafari (In re Jafari), 
401 B.R. 494 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2009)).  
 198 Jafari, 401 B.R. at 495. 
 199 Id. 
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dischargeability: under § 523(a)(19)(A) the plaintiffs must establish the debt is 
for violation of the securities laws; and under § 523(a)(19)(B), the debt must 
be memorialized in a judicial administrative order or settlement agreement.200 
The plaintiffs argued that language in subsection (B) authorized the bankruptcy 
court to determine both the liability and nondischargeability of a debt, and to 
rely on its own finding of liability to satisfy the memorialization requirement 
under § 523(a)(19)(B).201 
Judge Brown refuted this argument, and instead reasoned that by including 
the separate memorialization requirement under (B), Congress intended to 
distinguish § 523(a)(19) from other provisions of § 523 which do not contain 
the additional requirement that a judgment, order, decree, or settlement 
agreement finding fraud has occurred.202 Rather, Judge Brown looked to the 
legislative history of the statute as an articulation of Congress’s efforts to 
“ensure that judgments and settlements from state securities fraud cases are 
[nondischargeable] without the need to re-litigate the matter in the bankruptcy 
court.”203 Congress must have intended that one of the required elements for 
finding nondischargeability under § 523(a)(19) is that the liability 
determination be made outside the bankruptcy court because permitting the 
bankruptcy court to issue its own order or judgments under (B) would 
essentially read the requirement out of the statute.204 Thus, Judge Brown 
concluded, “Subsection B evidences a conscious choice to have the liability 
determination occur outside the bankruptcy forum.”205 
In light of the jurisdictional limitations illustrated by In re Chan and Jafari, 
the configuration of § 523(a)(19) adopted by the Faught and Sherman courts is 
 
 200 Id. at 496. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. at 497–98. 
For example, in § 523(a)(2)(A), the statute renders nondischargeable debts arising from fraud. It 
contains no requirement of a judgment, order, decree or settlement agreement finding that fraud 
has occurred. If no prior determination has been made, the bankruptcy court itself may hear and 
determine liability for fraud. . . . Similarly, if the parties entered into a settlement agreement, 
admitting fraud, the bankruptcy court might not give collateral estoppel effect if the matter had 
not been “actually litigated.” If the admission or prior determination is not entitled to preclusive 
effect, then nothing in the statute prevents the bankruptcy court from hearing and determining if 
the debt arises from fraud, without regard to the prior determination. 
Id. 
 203 Id. at 498. 
 204 Id. at 499. 
 205 Id. (emphasis in original). 
BAIRD GALLEYSPROOFS2 8/7/2014 12:09 PM 
418 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 30 
problematic because it vitiates the judgment and characterization of the 
underlying debt that has already been determined by non-bankruptcy courts. 
For example, in Sherman, Judge Fisher recognized that by characterizing the 
debtor as a “nominal defendant”206 the non-bankruptcy court had essentially 
prohibited the debtor from forming any legitimate claim to the disputed 
property.207 The judge reasoned: “A nominal defendant’s lack of legitimate 
claim to the money subject to disgorgement has powerful consequences in 
bankruptcy. If a debtor does not own an equitable interest in property . . . [it] is 
not ‘property of the estate,’ and therefore is not available to creditors.”208 
Similarly, the dissenting opinion of Judge Briscoe in Faught emphasizes that 
judgment against the debtor for participation in a scheme that violated 
Oklahoma state securities laws had already been determined by the Oklahoma 
state courts.209 
Thus, a key flaw in the majority’s reasoning, as identified by Judge Fischer 
and Judge Briscoe, is that by permitting the debtor to discharge debts owed for 
disgorgement actions, the court is not only infringing on the jurisdiction of 
other courts but also sanctioning a transfer of investor funds to which the 
debtor has no equitable interest to the trustee for disbursement to other 
creditors.210 The decision effectively permits an involuntary transfer of the 
funds—initially procured from the victims through fraud—from the victims to 
the creditors of the debtor.211 
 
 206 Sherman v. SEC (In re Sherman), 658 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Sherman v. SEC (In re 
Sherman), 491 F.3d 948, 959 (9th Cir. 2007)), abrogated by Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 
1754 (2013). 
 207 Id. at 1022 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
 208 Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 209 Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Wilcox, 691 F.3d 1171, 1177 (10th Cir. 2012) (Briscoe, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 210 See Kull, supra note 16, at 279–80. Kull explains: 
Restitution in bankruptcy involves a kind of “second-order” restitution, meaning that the transfer 
at issue is once removed from the transfer in which the restitution claim originates. The 
transaction begins with a nonconsensual transfer from the claimant to the debtor. With the 
debtor’s insolvency, however, the transfer at issue . . . is no longer between the claimant and the 
debtor, but between the claimant and the creditors of the debtor.  
Id. Among the scenarios identified to qualify as “nonconsensual transfers” is a “transfer of property induced by 
fraud, mistake, coercion, or undue influence[.]” Id. at 279. 
 211 Id. at 282. 
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A. The Preclusive Treatment of Disgorgement Orders Prior to § 523(a)(19) 
Determining the proper preclusive effect a bankruptcy court should give to 
disgorgement orders secured by regulators like the SEC is informed in part by 
the treatment such orders have received in the past.212 
Under the statutory precursor to § 523(a)(19), bankruptcy courts considered 
an exception to discharge for a disgorgement order when the judgment upon 
which it was based satisfied the elements of actual fraud.213 In the case of the 
purchase and sale of securities, courts would sometimes substitute elements of 
securities violations for elements of common law fraud.214 
For example, in SEC v. Bilzerian (In re Bilzerian), the court considered the 
disgorgement action brought against an investor who failed to file certain 
required disclosures in a timely fashion and made certain misrepresentations in 
the disclosures.215 The district court found the investor guilty of violating 
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and ordered the debtor to 
disgorge $33 million to the SEC.216 The investor filed for bankruptcy during 
the litigation in district court and the SEC sought to have the debt excepted 
from discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A).217 The bankruptcy court awarded 
summary judgment to the investor, permitting discharge by reasoning that the 
 
 212 See, e.g., SEC v. Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 1225, 1249 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (ordering 
disgorgements of profit defendant received for acquiring distributorship without paying for it, but declining 
disgorgement of salary he was paid in his capacity as company executive), aff’d without opinion, 556 F.2d 559 
(2d Cir. 1977); SEC v. Penn Cent. Co., 425 F. Supp. 593, 599 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (explaining that the SEC claims 
for disgorgement are not punitive but remedial relief to deprive defendants of the rewards they obtained for 
violating the securities laws); see also SEC v. Happ, 295 F. Supp. 2d 189, 197 (D. Mass. 2003) (explaining 
that disgorgement “does not serve to punish or fine the wrongdoer, but simply serves to prevent the unjust 
enrichment”); SEC Report, supra note 27, at 2–3 (describing disgorgement as an equitable remedy designed to 
deprive defendants of ill-gotten gains and that in contrast to actions for restitution which is brought to 
compensate fraud victims for their loses, disgorgement order requiring defendants to give up the amount by 
which they were unjustly enriched). 
 213 Kasey T. Ingram, The Interface Between the Bankruptcy Code and a Disgorgement Judgment Held by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, 5 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 31, 46 (2003). This meant that 
the “creditor must prove that 1) the debtor made false representation to deceive the creditor, 2) the creditor 
relied on the misrepresentation, 3) the reliance was justified, and 4) the creditor sustained a loss as a result of 
the misrepresentation.” Id. at 47 (citing SEC v. Bilzerian (In re Bilzerian), 153 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 
1998)). 
 214 See Ingram, supra note 213, at 47–48 (quoting Bilzerian, 153 F.3d at 1282). See generally Hildbold, 
supra note 79, at 567 (differentiating between the SEC’s enforcement claims for nondischargeability and the 
requirements for fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A) prescribed in Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995)). 
 215 Bilzerian, 153 F.3d at 1280.  
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. at 1281. 
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disgorgement judgment did not meet the loss and reliance requirements of 
§ 523(a)(2)(A).218 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit overruled the bankruptcy 
court, finding the disgorgement order had estoppel effect and was 
nondischargeable because the “materiality” element supplied in a Rule 
10(b)(5) action satisfied the element of actual reliance required in 
§ 523(a)(2)(A).219 
Historically, the courts have also permitted SEC disgorgement actions 
against individuals who are not participants in the scheme to defraud, but who 
are “nominal defendants.”220 In SEC v. Colello, the Ninth Circuit considered 
whether the SEC could recover investor funds traced to a party that was a non-
participant in the fraud.221 The defendant received nearly $2.9 million of $21 
million that the company obtained by defrauding nearly 700 public 
investors.222 Unable to obtain an injunction against the defendant, the SEC 
named him as a defendant “solely for the purpose of obtaining full relief.”223 
The court determined that equitable authority of the federal courts was broad 
enough to “recover ill gotten gains for the benefit of the victims of 
wrongdoing, whether held by the original wrongdoer or by one who has 
received the proceeds after the wrong.”224 Generally, a creditor seeking to add 
a nominal defendant must demonstrate that the defendant received ill-gotten 
funds and that he does not have a legitimate claim to the funds.225 Here, while 
the SEC in Colello was not able to prove that the defendant’s claim to the 
funds was illegitimate, the defendant was equally unable (actually, unwilling) 
to prove that his claim was legitimate.226 The court upheld the disgorgement 
order and excepted the debt from discharge.227 
These cases are instrumental in demonstrating that prior to § 532(a)(19), 
federal courts permitted the SEC considerable latitude in securing 
disgorgement actions against defendants and observed the collateral effect of 
 
 218 Id. 
 219 Id. at 1282. 
 220 SEC v. Colello, 139 F.3d 674, 676 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).  
 221 Id. at 675 (stating that a nominal defendant “holds the subject matter of the litigation in a subordinate 
or possessory capacity as to which there is no dispute”) (quoting SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 414 (7th Cir. 
1991)).  
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. at 676.  
 225 Id. 
 226 Id. at 678. 
 227 Id. at 679. 
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those disgorgement orders when securing exceptions to discharge in 
bankruptcy. Read together, the cases demonstrate that the SEC historically has 
not been required to establish the debtor’s culpability or directly show that the 
debtor committed the fraud to secure the nondischargeability of a 
disgorgement order. 
B. Closing the “Loopholes” and Upholding Congressional Intent 
Despite the significant historical and doctrinal evidence to support the 
argument that a state-awarded disgorgement order should be preserved through 
discharge, the Sherman and Faught courts elected to go beyond the judgment 
and looked to the underlying liability of the debtor to determine the 
dischargeability of the debt.228 This approach is reminiscent of case law 
addressing the debtor’s discharge of debts pursuant to prepetition 
settlements.229 These cases are relevant to a discussion concerning § 523(a)(19) 
because a debtor will often enter a settlement agreement to avoid defending 
allegations of fraud in court.230 Thus, like the debtors in Sherman and Faught, 
the debtors that enter settlement agreements have never been formally charged 
with, or held liable for, a violation for security fraud. 
Debts incurred by debtors in prepetition settlements for fraud are generally 
denied preclusive effect in bankruptcy court. In Brown v. Felsen, the Supreme 
Court found that the prior judgment did not bar the creditor from re-litigating 
under the principles of res judicata because the debtor had essentially asserted 
a “new defense” by filing for bankruptcy, which the creditor was entitled to 
 
 228 See Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Wilcox, 691 F.3d 1171, 1176–77 (10th Cir. 2012); Sherman 
v. SEC (In re Sherman), 658 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 2011), abrogated by Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 
133 S. Ct. 1754 (2013) (“[W]e do not think Congress wanted to immunize these debts from discharge in 
bankruptcy, when the debtor has not been found guilty of any wrongdoing.”). 
 229 Compare, e.g., Greenberg v. Schools, 711 F.2d 152, 156 (11th Cir. 1983) (reasoning that a debt that 
originates from the debtor’s fraud should not be discharged simply because the debtor entered into a settlement 
agreement and that the Bankruptcy Court should look into the factual circumstances behind the settlement 
agreement to ascertain whether the debt should not be discharged in the bankruptcy proceeding), and United 
States v. Spicer, 57 F.3d 1152, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (going beyond the form of the settlement agreement to 
look at the fraudulent conduct of the debtor), with Key Bar Invs. v. Fischer (In re Fischer), 116 F.3d 388, 390 
(9th Cir. 1997) (holding that a prepetition agreement settling claims for fraud extinguished the underlying tort 
action and transformed it into a dischargeable contract debt), and In re West, 22 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(holding that a note given and received as substitute to the old obligation does not fully discharges the original 
debt and the nondischargeability of the original debt does not affect the dischargeability of the obligation 
under the note), disagreed with by Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314 (2003). 
 230 See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 128 (1979); Key Bar Invs. v. Fischer (In re Fischer), 116 F.3d 388, 
390 (9th Cir. 1997); In re West, 22 F.3d 775, 778 (7th Cir. 1994).  
BAIRD GALLEYSPROOFS2 8/7/2014 12:09 PM 
422 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 30 
answer through the submission of additional evidence.231 The court concluded 
that a prior judgment and record in a state court proceeding did not confine a 
bankruptcy court considering the dischargeability of the debt.232 The Seventh 
and Ninth Circuits deviated from this holding by adopting the position that a 
creditor’s acceptance of a prepetition settlement was a “novation,”233 which is 
a contractual debt that is fully dischargeable in bankruptcy.234 The Supreme 
Court rejected this reasoning in Archer v. Warner.235 In Archer, the parties 
settled a lawsuit by releasing the debtors from all fraud claims against them 
except for a $100,000 promissory note.236 When the debtors failed to make a 
payment on the note, the petitioners sued in state court.237 The bankruptcy 
court, the district court, and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found 
the note dischargeable.238 The Supreme Court, applying Brown, reversed the 
decisions of the lower courts.239 In his opinion, Justice Breyer revisited many 
of the points made by the Brown court, emphasizing that the statutory language 
adopted by Congress in § 523(a)(2)(A) demonstrated an intent to “ensure that 
all debts arising out of fraud are excepted from discharge, no matter their 
form.”240 
 
 231 Brown, 442 U.S. at 133.  
 232 Id. at 138–39. To support their decision, the court considered the language of § 17(a)—precursor to 
§ 523(a)(2)(A)—as indication that Congress intended inquiry into exceptions to the fullest extent possible. Id. 
at 138. 
 233 A novation is “[t]he act of substituting for an old obligation a new one that either replaces an existing 
obligation with a new obligation or replaces an original party with a new party.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(9th ed. 2009). 
 234 See Fischer, 116 F.3d at 390; West, 22 F.3d at 777.  
 235 Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 323 (2003).  
 236 Id. at 318. 
 237 Id. at 317–18. 
 238 Id. at 318. 
 239 Id. at 319, 323.  
 240 Id. at 321 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 138 (1979)). In 
Archer, the Supreme Court noted Congress’s preference for a broad interpretation of § 523(a)(2)(A). Id. 
(quoting Brown, 442 U.S. at 138). Over the course of twenty years, the Court returned to the presumption in 
Brown twice, restating that the intent of the statute is to permit the fullest possible inquiry into the nature of the 
debt and that all debts arising out of fraudulent conduct should be excepted from discharge. See Grogan v. 
Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991); see also Archer, 538 U.S. at 321 (quoting Brown, 442 U.S. at 138). 
Allowing a broad inquiry into the nature of the debt is compelling evidence that in the long history of 
fraudulent claims preceding Sherman and Faught, the Supreme Court preferred to interpret discharge 
provisions broadly in pursuance of a congressional policy favoring the interests of reinforcing securities 
regulators even though such decision may not give debtors a fresh start. See Grogan, 498 U.S. at 287; Howard 
B. Kleinberg, U.S. Supreme Court to Consider Whether a Prepetition Settlement Affects the Dischargeability 
of a Claim, 11 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 381, 388 (2002) (predicting that in ruling on Archer v. Warner, the 
Supreme Court would eschew the “novation theory” adopted as justification to discharge agreement settling 
allegations of fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A) in favor of making the “fullest possible inquiry” into the 
dischargeability of the underlying debts); see also Memory, supra note 56, at 633, 660. Scholars have argued 
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In Mollasgo v. Tills (In re Tills), the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern 
District of California considered whether a debtor’s obligation to pay a creditor 
$241,000 in accordance with an agreement settling allegations of securities 
fraud was excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(19).241 In Tills, the creditor 
brought claims against the debtor alleging fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation after the debtor’s real estate development venture failed.242 
In the agreement, neither party admitted fault or liability, but exchanged 
“mutual releases” after establishing that the $241,000 equated to full payment 
of damages in arbitration.243 Prior to signing the agreement, the debtor’s 
counsel assured him the debt would be dischargeable in bankruptcy and the 
debtor apprised the creditor of his intention to file for bankruptcy.244 
The court reasoned that the settlement agreement was not sufficient to 
confer collateral estoppel effect as to dischargeability because the agreement 
contained no express agreement to fault or liability of the debtor.245 Rather, the 
agreement stated the debtor did not concede liability.246 As such, the agreement 
did not provide a sufficient basis for establishing nondischargeability because 
there was no judgment evidencing that the debtor committed securities 
violations.247 Thus, the court attempted to render the culpability of the debtor, 
as it was stipulated in the securities agreement, to be the controlling issue when 
determining dischargeability under § 523(a)(19).248 
Yet, the court’s opinion seems to eschew legal form over substance. The 
opinion ignores significant facts—chief among them the debtor’s intention to 
discharge his debt prior to signing the settlement agreement.249 Senator 
Leahy’s comments in the Senate Report on SOX indicate that it was precisely 
 
that § 523(a)(2)(A) serves a dual purpose: namely, that the § 523(a)(2)(A) exception to discharge is as much 
about fairness to creditors and the compensation to victims as it is about providing the debtor a fresh start. See 
Kleinberg, supra, at 390; Memory, supra note 56, at 660. 
 241 Mollasgo v. Tills (In re Tills), 419 B.R. 444, 447–48 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2009).  
 242 Id. at 448. 
 243 Id. 
 244 Id. 
 245 Id. at 452–53 (explaining that as the “Settlement Agreement contained no discussion of the basis for 
[nondischargeability] and, instead contain[ed] a provision expressly stating that fault and liability are not 
conceded,” the agreement was not sufficient to independently establish that the Debtor committed securities 
violations). 
 246 Id. 
 247 Id. at 453. 
 248 Id. at 451 (explaining that the plain text of § 523(a)(19) suggested that an actual violation of securities 
laws was required before a debt could be excepted from discharge). 
 249 See id. at 448.  
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the attempts of fraudulent debtors to use bankruptcy law as a shield250 that 
prompted the passage of § 523(a)(19) to remedy the discharge of obligations to 
settlement agreements and “to help defrauded investors recoup their losses.”251 
Moreover, the Tills opinion misconstrues Archer v. Warner. Like the 
settlement agreement in the Tills case, the settlement agreement in Archer 
released the debtors “from any and every right, claim, or demand” that the 
creditors can bring against them, and added that parties did not “admit any 
liability or wrongdoing.”252 The Archer court held that such language 
“completely addressed” every outstanding state law claim of the parties except 
the claim for the money promised in the agreement itself.253 As such, the 
Archer analysis concluded that preclusive effect should not be given to a 
settlement agreement to prevent the creditor from litigating the dischargeability 
of the debt.254 
It is widely accepted that SOX operates as the Congressional response to 
confusion in the courts regarding the dischargeability of settlement 
agreements.255 The congressional record expressly states that Congress 
intended § 523(a)(19) to close the “loophole” in bankruptcy law that permitted 
debtors to discharge debts incurred through default on prepetition settlement 
agreements related to securities laws violations.256 However, courts 
interpreting § 523(a)(19) are losing sight of the significant jurisprudence that 
pre-dated the statute’s adoption and are morphing the provision’s language to 
deny creditor’s nondischargeability actions even when the creditor’s right to 
access the debtor’s funds has been established in state court.257 
 
 250 148 CONG. REC. S7418-01 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
 251 PATRICK LEAHY, THE CORPORATE AND CRIMINAL FRAUD ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2002, S. REP. NO. 
107-146, at 10 (2002).  
 252 Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 317 (2003).  
 253 Id. at 318–19. 
 254 Id. at 323 (holding that although the releases may have been a novation, there could still be a showing 
that the settlement arose under false pretenses and thus could be nondischargeable).  
 255 Mason, supra note 135 (arguing Congress enacted § 523(a)(19) in part to prevent dischargeability of 
settlement agreements).  
 256 LEAHY, supra note 251. 
 257 See, e.g., Mollasgo v. Tills (In re Tills), 419 B.R. 444, 452–53 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2009) (applying 
California contract law to an agreement settling creditor’s claims against debtor for securities fraud to hold that 
the agreement is not excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(19) because rules of statutory construction and 
legislative history demonstrate that the provision “focuses on securities violations rather than resolutions of 
allegations of securities violations”). The cases decided under § 523(a)(2) are not irrelevant to this discussion 
even though they regard a different statute. This interpretation of § 523(a)(19) overlaps § 523(a)(2) to the 
extent that the § 523(a)(19) exception arises from fraud. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 523.27 (Alan N. 
Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2009). 
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IV.  THE POSSIBILITY OF A “TYPE” EXCEPTION FOR SECURITIES FRAUD? 
Given the alternate textual interpretation of § 523(a)(19) and the analysis of 
the statute’s relevant legislative and legal history, there is at least some room to 
argue that § 523(a)(19) covers debts for disgorgement levied against debtors 
unjustly enriched by the fraud of a third party. However, the alternate 
interpretation still fails to thwart the literalist construction of the statute as a 
“conduct” exception. Part I.C of this Comment briefly outlined the two 
categories of exceptions observable in § 523.258 The first are categorized as 
“conduct exceptions” and “stem[] from [the] culpable act[s] personally 
committed by the debtor.”259 These are distinct from the “type exceptions,” 
which promote a government interest in the continued liability of the debtor 
but to which the debtor’s culpability is irrelevant.260 
An important question raised by the analysis of the Sherman and Faught 
opinions is whether § 523(a)(19) was properly categorized by the courts as a 
“conduct” exception.261 Courts construing the exception readily assume that 
because the exception references malfeasance of an individual, Congress 
intended it to exist beside and be interpreted in accordance with other conduct 
exceptions provided in the provision. For this reason, the § 523(a)(19) 
exception is commonly compared to other exceptions in the Code that require 
malfeasance to be directly imputed to the debtor.262 Some examples of conduct 
exceptions include: § 523(a)(2), which excepts from discharge the moneys 
obtained by, inter alia, actual fraud;263 § 523(a)(4), which excepts debts for 
fraud or defalcation while the debtor was acting as a fiduciary;264 and  
§ 523(a)(6), the exception for willful and malicious injury committed by the 
debtor.265 
 
 258 See supra Part I.C. Proper credit for originally articulating this distinction is due to Keith Sambur, who 
described the differences between “conduct” and “type” exceptions in his article. Sambur, supra note 90, at 
568. 
 259 Sambur, supra note 90, at 562, 564 (citations omitted).  
 260 Id. at 562, 566–67. 
 261 See generally Okla. Dept. of Sec. ex. rel. Faught v. Wilcox, 691 F.3d 1171, 1175 (10th Cir. 2012) 
(emphasizing that the § 523(a)(19) was intended to penalize perpetrators); Sherman v. SEC (In re Sherman), 
658 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B)), abrogated by Bullock v. 
BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754 (2013). 
 262 See Sherman, 658 F.3d at 1014. 
 263 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (2012).  
 264 Id. § 523(a)(4). 
 265 Id. § 523(a)(6). 
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However, after conducting a thorough analysis of the language in 
§ 523(a)(19), there is reason to believe that § 523(a)(19) may just as easily be 
categorized as a “type” exception created by Congress to further the 
government’s interest in providing American investors the opportunity to 
recover their lost savings and earnings from other investors that had no right to 
possess their property in the first place. Such a policy lends stability to the 
market for securities by improving the effectiveness of the SEC in the effort to 
enforce regulations and redistribute moneys in the wake of a fraudulent 
scheme’s collapse. Likewise, the policy also lends stability to the national 
economy by mitigating the amount of losses sustained by victims of massive 
fraudulent schemes. 
In considering a characterization of § 523(a)(19) that is meant for investor 
protection, it is prudent to remind scholars that the exception was created by 
Congress in the context of broad legislative reform expressly intended to 
“restore[] trust in the financial markets by ensuring that corporate fraud and 
greed may be better detected, prevented and prosecuted.”266 The legislative 
history of SOX suggests Congress recognized that private investors were not 
the only parties injured by securities fraud. Rather, the government had an 
interest in ensuring that victims of security fraud were not excluded from an 
opportunity to recover their funds even if private litigation was cost 
prohibitive.267 Situated in the broad reform of SOX, it appears that 
§ 523(a)(19) was not drafted with the sole intention of punishing nefarious 
debtors, like the other conduct exceptions in § 523. Rather, it is apparent from 
the history of the Act and the other statutes contained in the legislation that 
§ 523 was intended to widen the avenues of recovery available to defrauded 
 
 266 See LEAHY, supra note 251, at 2. Other reforms in SOX enacted simultaneously with § 523(a)(19) are 
also persuasive of Congress’s intent to promote the government interest in protecting the investors and the 
market from the havoc created by fraudulent schemes. For instance, § 308 of SOX enacted a Fair Fund which 
permitted the SEC to recover funds on behalf of defrauded investors. See Winship, supra note 29, at 1118 & 
n.69. Since its inception, the business community has begun to perceive the Fair Fund as a substitute for a 
private cause of action against fraudulent securities companies. See Black, supra note 25, at 320, 336–37. 
 267 See LEAHY, supra note 251, at 9.  
In short, by the time a victim learns enough facts to file a complaint under a heightened pleading 
standard, survives a motion to dismiss, begins discovery, and learns that an additional wrongdoer 
or theory should be added to the case, that claim is likely to be time barred, then the wrongdoer is 
able to avoid liability and the victim is left holding the proverbial bag. Moreover, current law sets 
up a perverse incentive for victims to race into court, so as not to be barred by time, and 
immediately sue. Plaintiffs who wish to spend more time investigating the matter or trying to 
resolve the matter without litigation are punished under the current law. 
Id.  
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investors. Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized this nuance,268 
the government interest furthered by the SEC in seeking disgorgement was 
unfortunately lost on the judges sitting in the federal appellate courts. Had the 
Department argued that § 523(a)(19) was a “type” exception, any discussion 
concerning the culpability of the debtor would have been avoided, and the debt 
properly preserved. Thus, the circuit courts’ opinions soften the laudable goal 
of SOX. The exception to discharge created to close loopholes and help 
regulators recover assets for defrauded investors is thwarted by the narrow 
interpretation of § 523(a)(19). 
CONCLUSION 
The analysis conducted in this Comment indicates that there are two 
significant problems with the narrow construction of § 523(a)(19) adopted by 
the majority opinions in Faught and Sherman. The first issue relates to the 
difficulty of preserving the differences in the type of debt covered under 
§ 523(a)(2)(A) and the type of debt covered by § 523(a)(19). Comparing the 
language between the two statutes indicates that § 523(a)(19) ostensibly 
excepts the debtor’s obligation to pay disgorgement judgments because that 
debt is explicitly described in § 523(a)(19)(B) and must merely “result” from a 
violation of state or federal securities laws irrespective of the debtor’s 
culpability. 
Moreover, the narrow construction adopted by these opinions does nothing 
to assuage the disjunction between state securities legislators and the vast array 
of disparate claims that may arise under state and federal securities laws. The 
court’s opinions leave unanswered the issue of what preclusive effect state 
securities regulators should receive for the disgorgement orders awarded to 
them by state tribunals. While the majority opinions thoroughly addressed the 
question of who must violate the state and federal security laws, they neglected 
the determination of which judicial entity—state or federal tribunal—should be 
permitted to establish the violation and the nondischargeability of the debt. The 
standard established by the majority lessens the amounts securities regulators 
might recover because it effectively narrows the exception to direct violations 
of securities fraud. The opinions disappointingly fail to consider the vast array 
 
 268 See Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Blair, 231 P.3d 645, 655 (Okla. 2010). The court in Blair 
understood that the disgorgement debts pursued by the SEC should be looked at in a more holistic manner. The 
court recognized the disgorgement as an exercise of a state’s police and regulatory powers. “When the SEC 
seeks disgorgement, it is acting in a sovereign governmental capacity.” Id. 
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of cases that involve nominal defendants in possession of funds to which they 
have no legitimate claim. 
This last point is particularly troubling, both in policy and practice. While it 
is difficult to prove that the narrow construction of § 523(a)(19) frustrates the 
duties of the SEC as an enforcer, by extrapolating the effect of the discharge 
into bankruptcy, it is apparent that the narrow interpretation leads to 
dissatisfying results. Specifically, by permitting the debtor to discharge his 
obligation to disgorge funds to which he had no legitimate claim, the court is 
effectively allowing the debtor to retain those funds to pay off other creditors. 
Thus, the narrow interpretation of § 523(a)(19) threatens the balance of rights 
preserved in the bankruptcy process, and invites future attack on the scope of 
the bankruptcy court’s authority to encroach on the ownership rights of 
investors. The Ninth and Tenth Circuit Courts could have avoided such 
unpleasantness had they adopted the broad interpretation of § 523(a)(19), as 
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